COALITION: a great step forward

The recent formation of a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea marks an important stage forward in the struggle to liberate Kampuchea from Vietnamese aggression and occupation. The coalition was promptly hailed by the Vietnamese party newspaper as a 'corpse' and by the government as 'a monster created by Chinese expansionism and US imperialism'. Western press comment, though less morbid, was scarcely more enthusiastic. 'One of the world's most unlikely coalition governments' an 'unnatural alliance', an 'alliance of political convenience that has always seemed unlikely', an 'uneasy coalition' - these were some of the first reactions to the announcement of the decision to form the coalition. It was seen as a wholly opportunistic arrangement, either a trap set up by the 'Khmer Rouge' or a diplomatic sop held out by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and its chances of survival were rated very poor. The birth notices were barely distinguishable from obituaries.

It is understandable that because of the many delays and difficulties that have marked its birth, and also because of the misgivings and reservations voiced by some of the protagonists, scepticism should be expressed over both the genuineness and the prospects of the coalition government. Yet a moment's reflection should suffice to show that, precisely because of its long gestation and difficult birth, the chances of its survival and the prospects for its development and eventual success are indeed very promising. The pressures that have brought the coalition about, given their long-term character, will also secure its fruition, though that is not to say that it can or will be an easy process, or that the final victory for the Kampuchean people is just round the corner.

1979 - 1982: the long search for unity

The formation of a coalition government was high on the political agenda of the Kampuchean resistance right from the outset of Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in 1979. This was recognised by the leaders of the principal resistance organisations and by their followers and outside backers. Yet the unity of the Kampuchean resistance by no means proved easy of accomplishment. There were many reasons for this.

In addition to the very considerable legacy of bitter clashes and mutual resentments, bequeathed in particular by the 1975-78 period of communist rule in Democratic Kampuchea, what stood in the way of the unity of the Kampuchean resistance were serious differences between communists and nationalists over questions of tactics, organisation and leadership, which in turn were a reflection both of their differences of social background and of political outlook and of the very marked disparities in their actual military strength (and thus their capability to resist the occupation forces). The all-important question of how to strike a proper balance between short-term considerations of physical survival and long-term considerations of political success, or between the military and political requirements of the struggle, proved particularly hard to resolve. However, neither the Kampuchean communists nor the two nationalist groups could help but be conscious each of their own limitations and weaknesses in the face of Vietnamese occupation; and under pressure, from 'above' and from 'below' - that is, both from their outside supporters and from their own rank-and-file followers - the leaders of the three principal organisations were compelled to persevere with their search for unity.

Eventually, at a meeting in Singapore last September, the three leaders reached an agreement in principle to form a coalition government. The agreement was followed over the next two months by nine rounds of talks among their representatives to work out the details of the coalition arrangement, and while much ground was covered, particularly over the political programme of the coalition, the talks fell short of the final objective. This was due primarily to major disagreements between Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the government of Democratic Kampuchea led by Khieu Samphan, chiefly over the former's claim to a preponderant role in the proposed coalition which the latter feared was likely, at least in the short run, to hamper the armed struggle against Vietnamese occupation. The unity talks were in a stalemate for a couple of months over the proposal for a so-called 'loose coalition' which had been mooted by the Singapore government and was clearly intended to bolster the political and military position of the KPNLF, whom Singapore in a way had 'adopted'.

The 'loose coalition' idea was turned down by the DK side last January. It was by then fairly obvious that any attempt to 'bypass' DK or to build up a coalition that did not take due account of its military and diplomatic (and, even in a modest way, its political) weight simply would not work. So, at a meeting in Beijing in the latter part of February, Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan once again took up the quest for unity, this time on the basis though of a formula that was more favourable to DK's point of view. On the strength of these talks, and assisted by a great deal of behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity, the Thai government proposed the holding in Kuala Lumpur of a 'summit' of the three Kampuchean leaders to put finishing touches to the coalition arrangement. It was at a gathering in the Malaysian capital, hosted by the Malaysian government and attended by observers from all the ASEAN states, that on 22 June the agreement was announced of the formation of a
coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea. It was proclaimed on Kampuchean soil on 9 July by Sihanouk in his capacity as president of the new government.

Mounting pressures on the three leaders

This summary account of the steps leading up to the formation of the coalition government serves to highlight the important contribution made towards its realisation by the ASEAN states and, somewhat less conspicuously, by China. In the closing stages of the operation, the ASEAN governments - notably those of Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia - were not slow to display their impatience with the Kampuchean leaders, nor reluctant to apply a fair amount of ungentle persuasion, particularly against Son Sann, in order to get them to agree to form the coalition whatever their misgivings. (1)

This comparatively well documented 'pressure from above' on Kampuchean resistance organisations was reinforced by a kind of slow, less 'visible' and more diffuse groundswell of 'pressure from below'. Among the grassroots of these organisations, among their rank-and-file members and their lower level activists, in the refugee camps along the border with Thailand and among the 'colonies' of Kampucheans in exile in Europe and North America - among all those who were direct victims of Vietnamese occupation and therefore found themselves in the frontline of the struggle against it, evidence had been mounting of a growing impatience with the dilatoriness of their leaders in forming the coalition government. This could be sensed from the reports and 'rumours' of discontent among the younger members and middle-rank leaders in both the KPNLF and Sihanouk's group, MOULINAKA, at the foot-dragging by the top leaders on the issue of unity. It could be inferred, too, from the impression gained by several recent visitors to areas under DK rule of the steady coming to the fore of new elements, particularly at the level of village leaders, who were felt to be a great deal more open-minded and less sectarian than the top leaders. (2) This pressure, for all its diffuseness, must have been a factor in the 'softening' of established positions on the part of the top resistance leaders that finally made the agreement on the coalition possible.

The formation of the coalition government was thus in part a response to outside pressures. But that is not the whole story. For there were in addition pressures 'from within' that made the leaders of the resistance organisations, in the wake of their experiences of Vietnamese occupation and the struggle against it, face up to the reality of their own limitations and of their need for each other. There were two aspects to this. While the nationalists were obliged to recognise DK's military capabilities and strength, the commun-
ists in their turn had to recognise both their own political weakness and the nationalists' very considerable diplomatic and political assets.

'We are compelled to form this coalition,' declared Son Sann, none too enthusiastically. (3)

And Sihanouk, cheerful as ever, explained: 'I am a lamb. Son Sann is a lamb. We have to choose between being eaten by Khmers or eaten by Vietnamese. As Khmers, we prefer to be eaten by Khmers because we are nationalists.' (4) Apart from their profound and oft-expressed aversion to the 'Khmer Rouge' and their reluctance to enter into a close partnership with DK, both Sihanouk and Son Sann repeatedly voiced their preference for a 'political solution', that is, a peaceful or negotiated settlement to get the Vietnamese to leave Kampuchea. Yet all along, the Hanoi authorities had had no use for such a 'political solution,' sought as much by ASEAN states as by Kampuchean nationalists, and it was much against their inclination that the latter were finally brought to recognise the necessity for armed resistance to Vietnamese occupation. 'I support a political solution,' Son Sann said. 'But if the Vietnamese refuses to withdraw, we have no alternative but to continue to fight.' (5)

Sihanouk, again, was more explicit. He did not think it realistic to talk of defeating the Vietnamese on the battlefield. But, he added, 'the Vietnamese understand only the language of force. If you don't develop national guerrilla warfare against them, if you don't create more and more difficulties for them, they will never go to the conference table.' (6)

**Vietnamese dry-season failure decisive**

Having once recognised that there was no escaping armed resistance, the nationalist leaders could not escape the fact either that the forces of DK at present posed only the most serious military challenge to Vietnam's army of occupation; this had to be reflected in any unity arrangement, whatever their private feelings or public disagreements. In this respect the decisive development was the collapse of the Vietnamese army's dry-season military offensive against the forces of the Kampuchean resistance, notably those of DK, earlier this year. At the height of the Vietnamese offensive many reports spoke of the heavy battering taken by the DK forces, whose days were said to be numbered. By the time the dust of battle had settled with the onset of the monsoons, however, it was more than obvious that the DK forces had weathered the offensive in remarkably good shape, with the main body of their troops and bases largely intact, and it was really the Vietnamese who were not in such good shape. (7) (Hanoi's recent much-trumpeted 'partial troop withdrawal' is, in fact, a troop rotation exercise having to do with the great losses suffered by the Vietnamese army during its dry-season offensive.) (8)

So while the DK government may have been slipping behind diplomatically, as was claimed in several press reports, it more than made up for it by its superior military performance. (9) Once again, it had re-established its voice as the single largest, strongest and best-organised challenge to Vietnamese occupation, and thereby 're-validated' its claim to serve as the foundation for any coalition government. It was against this background and with the 'wet-season' diplomatic battles looming ahead, particularly at the non-aligned 'summit' conference and the annual General Assembly of the UN, both scheduled for September - that the ASEAN states leaned on the leaders of the two smaller nationalist organisations to get them to join the coalition on the basis of treating DK as a 'going concern' and to build upon what strengths the resistance already had.

**The strength of the nationalists**

This is not to say, however, that the DK government did not need the coalition as it was not the strongest party in terms of military strength. The communists, in fact, have had to recognise that the nationalists have very considerable diplomatic and political assets to contribute to the struggle against Vietnamese occupation. The diplomatic and, even more, the political position of DK is a good deal more vulnerable than its military strength and successes would indicate.

Both Sihanouk and Son Sann know this. The widely noted last paragraph of the 22 June agreement on the formation of the coalition government reserves to each of the three participating parties 'the right to its freedom of action so as to ensure its continuity'. This has been widely interpreted as an 'escape clause' tailored to DK's requirements, who would want to discard the coalition when it no longer suited their purpose. On this, Son Sann said in an interview:

The Khmer Rouge would not benefit at all from leaving. Why did they agree to join the coalition? Because they know the UN will vote less and less for them. If one day by their own action they withdraw the situation will be very bad for them. They have asked for this condition as a safeguard, but it is not a safeguard for them at all. (9)

And Sihanouk warned:

If the Khmer Rouge want to retake all power from Son Sann and Sihanouk, reject the tripartite coalition and be alone once again, they will lose. They will lose. (10)

As a reporter concluded, the communists are 'locked into the coalition and they have little choice but to make it work.' (11)
... and the weakness of the communists

This line of reasoning mainly emphasises the likely diplomatic gains for DK of the coalition arrangement. In the short run, of course, that is an important consideration. But military and diplomatic strengths, while important, are not enough as it is the political strength of the resistance that will be decisive in the long run. This political strength is a matter, above all, of the resistance developing a solid and impregnable popular base inside Kampuchea, drawing support from all classes of Kampuchean society. In this respect, not only is the communists' own position very weak, but the nationalists have an important and indispensable contribution to make, both in liberating Kampuchea from Vietnamese occupation and in re-building a new Kampuchea after liberation.

There is much evidence inside occupied Kampuchea itself (furnished, among others, by supporters of Vietnamese occupation) of a widespread if low-key antipathy to Vietnamese rule among the mass of the people. This antipathy has not yet been mobilised for the resistance largely because of the oppressive record of the communist government during the 1975-78 period. While the communists may still have some residual support among the poor peasantry, their political credibility among the Kampuchean people in general is by all accounts pretty low. No one quite believes that they have ceased to be communists just because they claim to have dissolved their party, or - more to the point - have undertaken any serious 'self-criticism' or rectification of their political ideas and methods of work. Their leadership appears to have remained unreconstructed, while their past remains a heavy and as yet undischarged liability. Thus, a very special responsibility rests on their shoulders to make a success of the coalition 'experiment'.

Tasks and prospects of the coalition

On the nationalist side of the political fence, both Sihanouk and Son Sann continue to enjoy a considerable degree of passive sympathy and support among the mass of the Kampuchean people, Sihanouk particularly among the rural masses and Son Sann among the urban middle classes. This is borne out, not least, by the periodical barrages of vilificatory propaganda directed at them from Phnom Penh and Hanoi. (12) One of the chief tasks of the leadership of the resistance - and, arguably, the key to its eventual political success - must be to tap this vast reservoir of anti-Vietnamese sentiment.

The formation of the coalition government is a great step forward precisely because it opens up new and unprecedented possibilities for tapping this popular sentiment and mobilising it for resistance against Vietnamese occupation. The coalition is in the first instance essentially a joining together of the diplomatic and political resources of nationalists to the military and organisational skills of communists. Having regard to their past troubled relations and their recent mutual suspicions, its setting up is a truly remarkable achievement for the different forces of the resistance, with which the whole Kampuchean people has every reason to be satisfied. The pressures that have brought this 'unnatural' and necessarily uneasy alliance about

flow out of deep and ancient springs of Kampuchean patriotism and national unity and pride. Taken together with the 'lessons' being taught by Vietnamese rulers' stubborn intransigence and their utter refusal to consider any 'compromise' or 'political solution' on the basis of respect for Kampuchea's independence, they are bound to continue to operate and to secure the unity of the Kampuchean resistance forces, notwithstanding any temporary difficulties that the coalition partners may encounter in the short run.

The coalition is admittedly in some ways but a beginning, and it would be some while before it can begin to serve effectively as a rallying-point for the fullest possible mobilisation and unity of all the Kampuchean patriotic forces against Vietnamese rule, both inside Kampuchea and abroad. As the coalition is consolidated politically and organisationally, it should begin given the class profile of Kampuchean society - to galvanise anti-Vietnamese national resistance and, in so doing, to bring about a far-reaching regroupment and realignment of Kampuchean political forces within both the communist and non-communist camps. The political prospects opened up by the formation of the coalition government are thus extremely encouraging and favourable to the further development and final victory of the Kampuchean resistance.
Worldwide opposition to Vietnam

The formation of the coalition government is likely to have a similar galvanising effect on broadening and deepening the world-wide opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. Its Kampuchean policy has brought Vietnam an unprecedented degree of international criticism and isolation. Until now, however, this tremendous opposition has not been fully harnessed to the cause of Kampuchean independence and in support of Democratic Kampuchea. This has been largely due to the unsavoury reputation of the DK government on account of its appalling record during the 1975-78 period, and the consequent reluctance of quite a few governments, for all their aversion to Vietnam's treatment of Kampuchea, to be seen siding with the 'Pol Pot regime'. Now that a genuinely representative and broadly based coalition of all the main tendencies in the Kampuchean resistance has come about, with Sihanouk as president and Son Sann as prime minister, many of these countries should feel far freer to extend their recognition and support to the DK government as well as continuing to oppose Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. The coalition thus opens up new possibilities for enlarging and developing both diplomatic mobilisation and solidarity work in support of the Kampuchean resistance under the banner of DK. It is a prospect that, for all their insouciance, has the Hanoi authorities seriously worried.

Up to the present, the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea have undoubtedly cost the rulers (as well as the people) of Vietnam dear; the country is faced with an acute crisis at all levels of state and society. This can be seen both from the reports of recent visitors and the admissions of the regime's own spokesmen.(13) At the same time, the authorities in Hanoi still remain in control of a formidable military machine, with a standing army well in excess of 1 million and lashily equipped with the most modern and sophisticated armament of all sorts. The soldiers of the occupation army are often reported to suffer from poor discipline and low morale, and the authorities are obviously finding it difficult to recruit soldiers for replacement and reinforcement in adequate numbers. Yet the army is not known to be suffering from any serious shortages of war materials and of training facilities; and for all their problems and set-backs on the battlefield, the Vietnamese authorities are apparently quite capable of carrying on with their war in Kampuchea for the foreseeable future.

This is possible only because of the 'friends' that Vietnam has, or more precisely because of one particular friend, namely, the Soviet Union. Soviet military (and other war-related) assistance has all along been absolutely crucial to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and to the realisation of its objectives in Indochina. The relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union is indeed very close and growing daily closer. At the same time, there is some uncertainty over the degree of closeness and the prospects of that relationship because of occasional reports of disagreement between the two. On a closer inspection, it will be seen that the relationship derives from a fundamental and long-term congruence of interests and encompasses a wide range of activities and links between the two countries. While it is inevitable, in the circumstances, that there should be occasional friction between the two, and some fluctuation in the closeness and warmth of their 'friendship', the Soviet Union is certain for the foreseeable future to continue serving as the chief supporter and provider for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea.

Beyond the Soviet connection, however, there is remarkably little international support for Vietnam for its Kampuchean policy, and indeed widespread antipathy because of it. There is little enthusiasm for Vietnam among the COMECON members; and in international forums, Vietnam can only count upon the support of the usual retinue of Soviet satellite states. Outside the 'Soviet family', outright political support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea has only come from India; and, latterly, the new French government, without actually extending its recognition to Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, has made a small beginning towards 'normalising' relations with Hanoi with a view to helping it out of its current 'isolation'. But India's lead has not been followed by the other non-aligned states, nor for that matter France's, either by its European allies or by its francophone clients in Africa.

International goodwill frittered away

Against the relatively meagre international support for Vietnam, the international opposition to its invasion and occupation is overwhelming and unremitting, as well as being highly varied in character and strength. Vietnam's international isolation has been repeatedly demonstrated at the UN where year after year, ever since its troops first marched into Kampuchea, it has been pill-
ored for its policy of aggression and occupation and faced with the demand for the withdrawal of all its troops from Kampuchea. A measure of Vietnam's isolation may be gained from the fact that, in October of last year, the UN General Assembly approved by a massive majority of 100 votes to 25 (with 19 abstentions and some absenteees) a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. This was in sharp contrast to the unanimous decision, barely four years earlier, of the same General Assembly admitting Vietnam into UN membership, with a record number of 105 member-states having co-sponsored its application for membership. Rarely could a country have frittered away so much international goodwill in so short a time.

International 'public opinion' as expressed through the UN has steadily moved against Vietnam over the past three years. At the 1979 General Assembly the anti-Vietnamese resolution calling for the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea was adopted by a majority of 91 to 21, with 29 abstentions. The same resolution a year later was adopted by an increased majority of 97 to 23, with 22 abstentions. The same resolution, at last year's General Assembly, was adopted by 100 votes to 25 against, with 19 abstentions. On the related credentials issue, the support for DK has continued to grow, though not quite on the same scale as the opposition to Vietnam's occupation. In 1980, 74 countries had voted for DK; last year the number rose to 79.

The most interesting feature of these figures is this. Last year, a full one-third of the countries (12 out of 36) that had voted against DK on the recognition issue shifted to a 'neutral' position (abstention or non-participation in the vote) when it came to the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, while nearly two-thirds of the countries (19 out of 30) which had abstained on the recognition issue voted in favour of the resolution calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. This argues the existence of a considerable body of countries within the UN which until now have been unwilling to translate their opposition to Vietnamese occupation into support for Kampuchean resistance. It is very likely that as a result of the formation of the coalition government a large part of this as yet passive or 'neutral' support will be mobilised on the side of DK. An indication of the way the wind is blowing can already be seen in the recent moves by senior UN officials to prepare the ground for cutting off all aid to the puppet regime in Phnom Penh, while continuing to assist Kampuchean refugees along the Thai border. (14)

The single largest component in the international 'coalition' opposing Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea is comprised of the mass of the relatively small and weak, non-aligned countries of the third world. Within the coalition, however, a number of countries have been particularly assiduous in opposing Vietnam, either because they are much more directly and closely affected by the Indochina conflict or because they are in a position, having both the will and the means, to apply various forms of pressure that hurt Vietnam and may eventually persuade it to give up its occupation of Kampuchea. The state of the coalition has been well summarised in a recent report:

The US, supported by Japan and West European countries, leads an aid and trade boycott that has contributed to the economic shambles over which Hanoi presides. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations keeps the heat on politically, ramming anti-Vietnamese resolutions through the UN and other international forums. China maintains military pressure on Vietnam's northern frontier.

Whenever Vietnam tries to break out of its isolation, someone somewhere moves in to block it. (15)

The remarkable thing about this coalition is, not that its various members should hold divergent views on the many long-term issues, but that for all their differences they should display a striking consensus over short-term policy in opposing Vietnam. They hold markedly varied and contradictory opinions on the related questions of the nature of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship and the future of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean relationship; given their diverse national perspectives, it would be surprising if it were otherwise. But just as all the forces of the Kampuchean resistance, so also all the forces of the international coalition have been impelled to cast their differences to one side in the face of Vietnam's stubborn persistence in its military occupation of Kampuchea.

ASEAN's vital role

The ASEAN states have all along played a particularly leading part in the activities of this informal coalition, whether in mobilising diplomatic support at the UN or other international forums, in co-ordinating policy with China, Japan, the United States and the European Community, or in pressing for the unity of the various forces of the Kampuchean resistance. This is

Vietnam's foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach: ASEAN tour a fiasco
fully recognised by Hanoi, which in turn has made ASEAN the principal target of its reputed diplomatic offensives (while keeping up a certain level of military pressure against Thailand, as well as issuing veiled threats of military 'retaliation' against other regional states). But all its diplomatic overtures have been flawed by an inherent and fatal defect, by its inability to sustain its control over Kampuchea by any means short of all-out military occupation, and thus by its inability to respond positively to ASEAN demands for a 'political solution' on the basis of respect for Kampuchea's independence and national sovereignty and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

At their annual meeting in Singapore in mid-June, the ASEAN foreign ministers reiterated their view that the 'continued Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea constitutes a serious threat to peace and stability in the whole Southeast Asian region' (16) and urged upon Hanoi the advantages of seeking a negotiated settlement leading to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Following the setting up and proclamation of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Hanoi authorities launched their latest diplomatic offensive with much fanfare, including the proposals for a 'international conference' on Kampuchea, which were the subject of high-pitched salesmanship on the part of the Vietnamese foreign minister in the course of his tour of four Southeast Asian capitals in the second half of July. The tour was generally reckoned to have been a 'flop' and a complete fiasco.

The ASEAN foreign ministers held a special one-day meeting in Bangkok on 7 August to say so. They pointed out that there had been no change in Vietnam's policy towards Kampuchea and stressed that the key to the Kampuchean problem remained the withdrawal of foreign troops and the right to self-determination of the Kampuchean people, and on that basis urged the international community to support the new coalition government headed by Sihanouk. (17) The Malaysian foreign minister, in commenting on Thach's tour, noted that there was 'no real change in the objectives of Vietnam - to continue to stay in Kampuchea', while the Singapore foreign minister, noting that Vietnam had not yet come to the point where it was prepared to negotiate a political settlement, re-affirmed ASEAN agreement on the need to apply economic pressure on Vietnam, since any granting of economic aid would only encourage Hanoi to persist in its present policy towards Kampuchea. (18) All this promises well for the further strengthening of international support for the cause of Kampuchea's independence as embodied by the new coalition government.

Solidarity work in Britain: improved prospects

The formation of the coalition should also give a fillip to the Kampuchean solidarity work in Britain. It is to be hoped that, in consequence of the proclamation of the coalition government under Sihanouk's presidency, the British government might be persuaded to restore its recognition to the rightful government of Democratic Kampuchea. At the popular level, until recently, the barrage of propaganda against 'the Pol Pot clique' by 'friends' of, and apologists for, Vietnam has obscured the much more fundamental issue of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. But it is surely significant that the Vietnamese propaganda machine in this country has latterly fallen silent; for those who nearly four years ago could see some merit in the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam as a means of removing a tyrannical regime, evidently can no longer muster much enthusiasm for an occupation that looks set for eternity but gives no sign of being acceptable to those, the Kampuchean people, for whose 'benefit' it was instituted in the first instance. For these misguided 'friends' of Vietnam the formation of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea cannot but be a cause for further discouragement, just as for the friends of the Kampuchean people and of Kampuchea's independence, in this country and elsewhere, it is a most heartening and promising development.

Notes

1. See P. Sriratchanya, 'Persistent matchmaker', Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 25.4.82; and R. Tasker, 'Trumpe up trio', FEER, 25.6.82.
2. See the first-hand account of a visit inside Democratic Kampuchea by M. McColgan, 'Inside Democratic Kampuchea', Kampuchea Bulletin, no. 11, Jan/March 1982.
3. Cited in Tasker, ibid, p. 8
4. Quoted in J. McBeth, 'None for all, all for none', FEER, 16.7.82, pp. 9-10
5. UPI despatch in Japan Times, 23.6.82
7. See W. Branigin, 'Cambodian Rebels Said to Retake Areas as Vietnam Ends Offensive', International Herald Tribune, 20.5.82; and N. Cumming-Brice, 'Kampuchea stalemate means more war', Guardian, 11.6.82.
9. Cited in Tasker, ibid, p. 9
11. Ibid.
12. See, for example, the report by M. Richardson, 'Sann's travelling salesmen', FEER, 19.2.82. Hanoi, though, has not been averse on occasion to flashing the 'Sihanouk card', as on the occasion of the recent visit of the Austrian foreign minister to the Vietnamese capital, in an attempt to isolate the 'Pol Pot clique'.
13. See for example, D. Southerland, 'Vietnam: Strengthens to win the peace', Christian Science Monitor (Weekly International Edition), 24.5.82; A. Cass, 'Vietnam: Where the misery lingers on', Financial Times, 15.6.82; and the string of reports by Colin Campbell published in International Herald Tribune in June '82. For voices from Hanoi itself, see P. Quinn-Judge, 'A Vietnamese Cassandra', FEER, 26.2.82, and H. Kamm, 'Grave Economic, Military Problems Beset Vietnam, Senior Aide Says'.
International Herald Tribune, 27.5.82, giving the views respectively of Nguyen Khac Vien and Hoang Tung.

14. See T. Morello, 'To aid or not to aid?', FEER, 20.8.82

15. Wain, ibid.

16. 'ASEAN Condemns Hanoi's Rule of Cambodia', International Herald Tribune 17.6.82

17. 'ASEAN Urges Support For Cambodian Rebels', International Herald Tribune, 9.8.82

18. See 'Ghaz: Asean seeking a neutral Kampuchea', New Straits Times, 7.8.82