


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**គណបក្សប្រល័យសម្តេច ព្រះបាទ សីហមុនី ព្រះបរមនរោត្តម**

**ព្រះបក្សប្រល័យសម្តេច ព្រះបាទ សីហមុនី ព្រះបរមនរោត្តម**  
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# **The Shining Victories of 1976**

## **and**

# **The Clear Bright Future of 1977**



The great victories in fulfilling the missions of continuing socialist revolution and building socialism and defending the country during 1976 opened a bright new page of history for the marvelous, correct, and clear-sighted Communist Party of Kampuchea, for the marvelous, mighty Kampuchean revolution, for the huge, marvelous Kampuchean people, and for the brave, mighty, skilled, and magnificent Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

### **1. The mission of socialist revolution**

Our Party correctly raised the mission of socialist revolution in every field, and we implemented it well and to the maximum and received the fruits to an important extent in leaps and bounds.

1. As for the various exploiting classes that were attacked and overthrown, we struck them again during 1976 and further annihilated them. They cannot raise their heads ahead, whether in the countryside, in the cities, in the ministries, or in the offices or in the revolutionary ranks inside the Party. This attack and annihilation was not an easy thing just done in one or two fields; it was systematic, an attack on every field to dig them out by the large roots and the small roots.

2. The private ownership regime of the feudalist landowners and the capitalists, like the various other classes that are non-proletarian and the petty bourgeoisie of the private farmers, private workers, and the private laborers, were also dug out by the roots during 1976, and private ownership will not be allowed to raise its head again.

3. We attacked private ownership to a major extent and profoundly during 1976; we attacked it inside the Party; we attacked it inside the Army; and we attacked it among the people, in particular inside the Party and inside the ranks of our revolution.

These are three aspects that show that our victories were substantial in continuing to wage socialist revolution during 1976. We did everything inside the national society and inside our ranks, and we worked in every field; we worked in ideology and economics; we also worked in culture, technology, and science. We worked systematically.

When we assess the results, we see that the victories were great. Looking at the ordinary picture, it seems as if nothing has changed. However, looking at the theme of the fight of class struggle inside our socialist revolution framework, we worked profoundly. This appears as a good factor inside the entire Party; there is strong unity in the fight against the enemies that penetrated into the Party. This cast an influence on our Army, and made our Army cleaner and then even more dictatorial instrument of the Party. Had we not carried out such profound socialist revolution like this, our Army would not be clean like this and would not be in unity like this, and there may have been dangers too.

This cast a good influence on the people and made the people able to purge and eradicate bad elements time and time again, made our national society among the people cleaner, and guaranteed the work of socialism and defending the country.

If socialist revolution had not been so profound, the Party would be complicated, the Army would be complicated, the people would be complicated, and the ministries and offices would be complicated. The work of defending the country would have failed. There would have been difficulties both inside and outside the Party in both the immediate and long term.

This is to clarify the important meaning and the role of socialist revolution. Socialist revolution dominates everything. It is the fundamental factor of our current revolution. Building socialism is not the fundamental. Defending the country is not the fundamental. Building socialism and defending the country are important factors, but all these factors must be based on the foundation of socialist revolution before the immediate and long term future can be guaranteed.

As a specific example during 1976 speaking just about inside the Party, by making profound socialist revolution, the disease within the Party that occurred since the national democratic revolution that could not be seen was exposed, because the abscesses in national democratic revolution were microbes. With the level of national struggle and class struggle inside the national democratic revolution framework, we could not see and locate the germs inside the Party. They were able to embed. But when we carried out socialist revolution profoundly and strongly and broadly within the Party, the Army, and the people, we found the bad germs. They came out. They came out because of the true nature of socialist revolution, which pushed them out. So then, this enabled us to eradicate traitor elements dangerous to the Party and our revolution in a timely manner.

This makes clear the good essential characteristic of socialist revolution. This view leads us to make it clear that socialist revolution is not carried out so that there will be more contradictions. Perhaps some people think that socialist revolution has been too

profound and has led to the creation of additional contradictions. Some elements understand that class struggle leads to the creation of contradictions. There certainly is this view on this issue. This is a view of a person who does not want to see the contradictions; however, the contradictions do exist. When we cover them up time after time, it becomes corrupt inside, corrupt inside society, corrupt inside the Party and inside the Army. If we do not make profound socialist revolution, they will build many forces.

An example: The traitor strings that we smashed successively were organized traitor strings, systematic strings, that had existed since the national democratic revolution period. However, during that period, they could live with us. In socialist revolution, they were segregated out.

1976 was a year of these class combat inside our revolution and inside our Party. Many germs appeared. All the traitor strings appeared.

So then, we did not raise socialist revolution so there would be contradictions. In truth, the contradictions had already existed for a long time, but they had been buried. We must clearly resolve this mistaken view that exists within our ranks. When socialist revolution is absorbed inside the Party, inside the Army, and inside the people, it segregates the good and bad elements, the revolutionary elements and the traitor elements.

In order to guarantee our revolution's rectitude on into the future, it must be based on socialist revolution. We must absorb these invaluable and lofty lessons.

The success of socialist revolution factors into every field like this. This is the general experience.

Standing upon this general experience, we come to examine the experience in each location, in each unit, in each base area. Any location, unit, or base area that makes profound socialist revolution leads to good Party building, good national defense, good building of the country, good fulfillment of every mission. To the contrary, any base area or any unit that does not wage socialist revolution well does not do Party-building well: and the movement does not rise and is not fast; building is not fast and the fulfillment of routine missions is not fast. Sometimes there is no visible sign of opposition; but, it lies dormant. Sometimes there signs of complications and breaks in solidarity emerge. When we wage socialist revolution well, we can sort this out immediately.

In summary, this year we wage socialist revolution profoundly to an important extent. This has emerged as a good factor in eradicating traitors embedded inside the Party, inside the Army, and among the people and has enabled us to be able to defend the country well and build the country well.

In tandem with this, we must see that our socialist revolution has been systematic in 1976. In 1973, we just carried it out in the cooperatives. As for doing it within the entire Party, the entire national society, the entire Army, we had not yet done that

previously. We just recently did that during 1976. We did it very quickly. National defense was complete and good, not complicated or difficult. We built the country well.

But one year is not a foundation; it is incomplete; it must be continued. In 1977, it will continue. In later years, it must be continued. This is due to the following reasons:

1. Our subjective factors: We are not yet rid of contradictions inside the Party, internal contradictions. There is still private ownership: whether a little or a lot, it still exists. This is an aspect of contradiction between collective ownership and private ownership. This problem still arises. If we do not resolve it well, this contradiction will change from quantity to quality, and some day this problem will become an antagonistic contradiction, a counter-revolutionary contradiction. This is speaking about private ownership.

Along with this, we may pose the question of whether or not there are still any more enemy activities to sneak to embed inside the Party, whether or not these activities are gone. The experience of the last ten years shows that they clearly are not gone. This is because Party induction in the past was firm in part and relaxed in part. Thus, the enemy is still able to penetrate. They still exist; there may be just one or two, but they still exist.

2. The objective factors: Enemies in every direction continue to carry out activities. They create antagonistic contradictions. Whether they create few or many, they create them routinely. They create them in every fashion, hot, cold, overt, covert, flexibly, by boring from within ... in every fashion.

So then, this is why we must make clear the view that we must continue to carry out socialist revolution and not take internal contradictions lightly, because internal contradictions develop. If we do not fight to eradicate private ownership, after a long time it will transform from quantity to quality into counter-revolution. These cases have occurred one after another. Thus do not take them lightly. Do not evaluate internal contradictions as being antagonistic contradictions; however, it is imperative to see that internal contradictions develop successively. So then, it is imperative to struggle to build to see the development of contradictions in order to gain mastery in leadership, in order to gain mastery in taking measures.

We see the contradictions within us in order to shrink and eradicate them.

We see the contradictions within the Party in order to wage class struggle inside the concrete revolutionary movements.

We see the internal contradictions and see the antagonistic contradictions in accordance with their concrete visible signs in order to take measures to sort out the contradictions in accordance with their actual type and to gain mastery.

So then, in 1977 it is imperative to carry out socialist revolution profoundly and systematically in every field. It is imperative to be meticulous and not fear the loss of one

or two traitorous elements. Based on socialist revolution, we can make an examination and see that there is only profit: there is no loss. The profit is very large. If we do not sweep clean the traitor elements and if we leave them as they are, they will expand and this will lead to danger for the revolution. Getting rid of the traitor elements is a big victory. Purge the Party by way of socialist revolution. Strengthen the Party by way of socialist revolution.

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## 2. The mission of building socialism

We have also had major successes in the mission of building socialism.

### A. The field of strengthening and expanding the collective regime

We strengthened and expanded the position of collectivity in general throughout the entire nation and society. We strengthened and expanded all the cooperatives in the countryside, and they are even higher in quality than they were during 1975. Now our cooperatives in general are village cooperatives. In tandem with this, a suitable number of subdistrict cooperative locations have been organized. The locations where this has been done have gained management experience and are operational.

In the cities, all of the workers are collective workers; there is no private ownership.

So then, our people in general, the workers and the peasants, are all collective workers and peasants. This collectivity is no ordinary collectivity; its composition is high level, with:

- collective means of production
- collective tools to increase production
- collective eating and living

- collective work, etc. It is no ordinary collectivity; there are organized mobile forces divided into regular forces, one, two, front, and rear, at a high level.

So then, we fundamentally and completely eradicated the old production contacts. New collective production contacts have been strengthened and expanded, organized into front units and rear units enable the building of the country to go well. During 1976, we lacked food supplies, medicines, tools, but high-level collective organizational forces with units on the offensive in the front and in the rear enabled us to fight hard. We sorted

out transitional food supplies to a large extent. Canals, paddy-dike systems, and feeder canals were sorted out to a large extent, exceeding plans. This is the result of our position of collectivity. This position of collectivity emerged from our socialist revolution. The collective position is divided into separate fields, economics, culture, social affairs, technology, and science. In tandem with this, ideology during 1976 had an important level of collectivity inside the Party, among the people, and inside the Army. **But in comparison with other fields, ideology is slow.** It has not changed in time at all with the collective movement in terms of organization and economics. However, the collective ideology of the proletarian class has had a very actively combative role, even though it has been slow.

The Party and the Army, in general and to an important extent, also have a collective position in terms of organization, economics, and living. So then, they are high-speed, in tandem with the development of the people. We see this in order to concentrate more on the field of ideology.

As for the experience of deploying in collective position during 1976, as we examine and look at it, the key factors are the Party and cadres. When we sort out the collective position well inside the entire Party and at every Party echelon, this casts a good influence on the Army. So then, progress during 1976 in terms of the collective position was due to the Party. However, the slow part on the ideological side is due to the Party being slow in terms of ideology. So then, in accordance with this experience, the major issue in sorting this out in the future is strengthening and expanding the collective position of the Party in the fields of organization, economy, and living. **In tandem with this, struggle to build ideology collectively inside the Party to make to better and more effective.** Do whatever it takes to make them strong. The line is already correct; the measures are already correct; there remains only the methodology of struggling to build internally to make them understand, be crystal-clear, and be clear-sighted. Have them see the reasoning. Making socialist revolution has its own reasoning.

In eradicating private ownership and the private regime, have them see the reasoning clearly. So then, in the future it is imperative to concentrate of ideological revolution inside the Party, socialist revolution inside the Party. This is because the lines of the Party in every field emerge from the concrete movements. Our movements are very fast. So then, it is imperative to do political and ideological work quickly. It is imperative to demonstrate the good essential characteristics of collectivity by using concrete examples that exist in each unit.

## B. Building has made leaps and bounds.

We were empty-handed, lacked food supplies, lack means, and had many cattle and buffaloes fall sick and die, and the external enemies and the internal enemies carried out constant activities. There was no aid from the world. We took a stance of complete self-reliance, and we were able to sort out the livelihood of the people by increasing production of transitional food supplies by growing rainy season rice. Generally



speaking, we were able to achieve 90 percent of our three-ton plan. We have resolved fertilizer and water exceeding plans with independence and mastery. So then, our building of socialism is strong, quick, high-quality, with independence and mastery.

Our doing this is extraordinary. We had countless difficulties, but we were able to do it. This is a major lesson and a major experience; it must be recorded in our history. 1977 will not be as difficult as 1976. 1978 and 1979 will be even less difficult than 1976. The year of serious difficulty was 1976. 1975 was not as difficult as 1976. In 1975, there were still forces and food supplies. As for 1976, the original resources almost totally ran out. Almost everything had to be re-organized. The re-organization was planned and systematic during 1976. In this state, we took a stance of independence, mastery, and self-reliance. We were able to sort it out, and we achieved the 1976 Plan in the sense that in 1977 we eat following the Party ration, there is enough seed and we exported some. So then, our being able to pass through this must be recorded in the history of our Party. The fight on the socialist revolution side is hot, strong, and profound. Building socialism has been systematic and really strong. This comes from a high stance of independence and mastery, a spirit of patriotism, and a high revolutionary spirit. In tandem with this, the spirit of proletarian class internationalism is high. We have been able to defend the country, sort out the livelihood of the people, and maintain the purity of our revolution during the current complicated world situation.

This is a major positive quality and is a key in the post-liberation period. If we maintain the 1976 level of combat on into 1977 and 1978, we will be very strong because our forces will increase, food supply will be sufficient, the health of the people will be stronger than before, the forces of the livestock will be stronger than they were in 1976, and the forces of various tools will be stronger than they were during 1976.

Along with this favorable quality, shortfalls still exist:

For instance, sorting out the people's transitional food supplies has been one of our unfavorables. We have still not absorbed the line of sorting out transitional food supplies. Some locations have sorted this out well; however, three-fourths of the entire country has not sorted this out well. This has to an extent impacted the health of the people. So then, this issue arises from subjective factors of the Party. The line has not been closely grasped. The stance of socialist revolution is not yet strong. The spirit of responsibility is not yet strong. Some locations have similar land, similar food supply shortages, and similar water shortages; however, some locations have been able to resolve them and some have not. Sometimes the upper echelon has absorbed this, but the lower echelons have not, and there has been no detailed follow-up and constant sorting out.

Another shortfall is the stance of independence, mastery, self-reliance and creativity; there are still deficiencies in the base areas in the Zone frameworks, the Sector frameworks, and the District frameworks. This can clearly be sorted out to some extent inside the District frameworks; this can clearly be further sorted out to some extent inside the Sector frameworks and further sorted out in the Zone frameworks too. Some locations

have resolved a lot and have accomplished the plans and even surpassed them with self-reliance. The factors are still Party factors: absorbing the line in an implementational sense and organizing effectively. If these issues can be resolved, any issue can be resolved. There will be no more issues of food shortages, whether in 1977 or on into the future. We will have many more preconditions than we did during 1976. So then, it is imperative to concentrate on the issue of self-reliance by relaying on the Party, the Army, and our people. In this, the Party must act as the core. In this, the issue of the position of collectivity arises. In this, concentrate on the Sector level and in particular the District and Subdistrict levels and the cooperatives. Concentrate on the line of collectivity in the sense that the water issue has two aspects: some locations lack water; some store it, but some do not. When there is a lot of water, some locations have the same amount of water, but the issue of the activity line arises. The Party has instructed that at the end of this year to get ready to conserve water. Some have done this well; some have not. This is not speaking about high ground, but the lowlands. But some locations have been unable to sort this out.

We mention these shortfalls so that we can move forward strongly. These shortfalls in the framework of the favorables are fundamental. When we learn from the experiences of 1976, we will have a lot of experience for later years. From stances to activity lines, we will have more confidence in ourselves.

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### 3. The mission of defending the country

Generally speaking, the results of our work of defending the country have been good to the maximum.

1. Defending the fruits of the revolution has been good to the maximum and complete. Also, there are the preconditions for expanding the fruits of the revolution well in the future.

2. We have been able to defend the entire country. This is the overall result.

The reason: experience.

During 1976 there were some general aspects which we bring up for examination:

1. The enemy harassed us from the outside. During 1976, the enemy harassed us from the outside to test our forces and assess our forces. Had we been weak, they would have penetrated further inside. However, our forces of every type were able to resist and defend, demonstrate their identity, and eradicate the enemy. This means that

the preparedness of our Army in defending entry passes both large and small is much more masterful than it was in 1975.

2. The enemy harassed us inside the country. This year, the enemy is far weaker than they were in 1975. The reason is because the revolutionary state authority is even better and is even more revolutionarily vigilant. This is because the situation is strengthening and expanding in the direction of the Party. This is because politics, ideology, defense, and patrol measures are even better than they were in 1975.

3. Other manifestations are the events that it is imperative to concentrate on during 1976, namely the attempts to smash the Party leadership and attack and overthrow our revolution. They are traitor forces, foreign subjects; they sneak in to embed inside our flesh and blood. Their plans are big. They attack to overthrow the Party leadership, and through this they attack to overthrow the Kampuchean revolution and make Kampuchea subject to a foreign country. We eradicated them in time because our socialist revolution was good, our revolutionary vigilance was high, and our organization was meticulous.

Through this experience, we see that the decisive factor in eradicating enemies of every type is the factor of good Party leadership of socialist revolution during 1976. It was this that was the decisive factor, the fundamental, not the material factor.

In summary, under the correct, clear-sighted, and magnificent leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea, the people and our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea accomplished the missions of the Party of 1976 in a great victory and opened a new bright stage of our history only 20 months after the great victory of the liberation of the entire country in eradicating the American imperialists and their servants and overthrowing the feudalists, landowners, and capitalists.

The great shining victories of 1976 had made a clear, bright future for more great victories in fulfilling the Party's missions for 1977.



**Immediately after finishing their offensive to gather and out up the harvest, the people of our cooperatives in the Sa-ang - Koh Thom area rush immediately to fight hard to grow dry season rice.**

**This photo: The brothers and sisters are transplanting as fast as their arms and legs will go.**

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**The Presentation of**

**The Comrade Party Representative**

**On the Occasion of the 9<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of**

**The Founding of the Brave, Strong, Skilled, and**

**Magnificent**

**Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea**



18 January 1977 is the date of the celebration of the 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. On that occasion a great meeting was convened in Phnom Penh with the male and female combatants of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, the members of all Division Committees, military representatives stationed in the various Zones, and cadres and male and female combatants from every ministry and office in attendance.

On that occasion, the Comrade Party Representative gave a presentation that clearly demonstrated aspects of every field of our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, showing the mighty power of our Revolutionary Army, our revolution, our Party, and our people, enlightening us and giving us firm, clear confidence in our Party, our Army, our revolution, the Party line in every field, and our people.

We wish to extract the important points of that presentation for dissemination for our comrades to study and learn from, as follows:

In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and in the name of the Military Committee our Communist Party of Kampuchea Center, I wish to express my congratulations to all the comrade representatives of all three categories and of the Army, land, sea, and air, and the comrade representatives of the Army stationed in the various Zones, and my congratulations to the comrade representatives of every ministry and office of the Party in the capitol city who are gathered here today for the ceremony to celebrate the 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of our Revolutionary Army. Today, in the name of the Military Committee of our Party Center, I wish to give a presentation on a number of issues related to the history of our Revolutionary Army.

**Issue One:** Our impressions on the occasion of the celebration of the 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea

**Issue Two:** Informing you about the history of the birth of our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea

**Issue Three:** Informing you on a number of views regarding the political lines of the Party, the Party's line of people's war, and the Party's combat line

**Issue Four:** Informing you on the mission of building, strengthening, and expanding our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea on into the future

The objective of thee presentations is to demonstrate aspects in every field of our Revolution Army, aspects of its birth, and its present and future missions so that you will clearly see and clearly grasp these views so that you will be enlightened and have clear confidence in our revolution and in the missions of our Revolutionary Army.

Next, I wish to begin the first issue that I just mentioned.

### **I. Our impressions on the occasion of the celebration of the 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea**

On the occasion of our meeting here, and in circumstances of the framework of the throughout the country also meeting to celebrate this 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, our impressions are as follows:

Our first impression is that this 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of our Army leads us to think about the high and lofty heroism of our Revolutionary Army. It is an opportunity for us to silently contemplate and be profoundly moved with revolutionary class pride toward our comrades in arms, the male and female combatants and the cadres of our revolutionary Army who made every sacrifice in the successive national struggles, in class struggle, tense, complicated, twisting, and difficult until the complete and permanent liberation of Kampuchea and the liberation of the worker-peasant classes coming to hold the status as masters of the country, the complete and permanent masters of their destinies.

Our second impression on this occasion is that all of us, when we think of our Revolutionary Army that we built with our bare hands up until today, we are all happy and unimaginably satisfied because originally we never had an army. We were in the claws of the imperialists and the other exploiting classes. However, now our Revolutionary Army has come into being and has strengthened and expanded from covert guard units to guerilla units and Sector units, on up to regular forces that wage guerilla war and war of every type, a civil war and a war of liberation to liberate the nation and the people and oppose the American imperialists and their servants until we seized the great victory of 17 April 1975. We have strengthened and expanded the Army politically, ideologically, and organizationally. Today, our Army is an army that has two clear characteristics. The Army's true nature is being revolutionary and being the pure dictatorial instrument of the Party and it is an army with every type of organization, land sea, and air, to defend the country along its land, sea, and air borders and defend the inside of the entire country of Kampuchea.

Throughout our history of thousands of years, we never had our own army. Seeing this gives us much pride and satisfaction in our hearts toward our people, our Army, and our Party that carried out the long struggle to build Democratic Kampuchea and build the collective worker-peasant classes, build the revolutionary state authority, and build the extremely brave Revolutionary Army.

Two of our feelings on this occasion are feelings of respect for the heroism of our Army and our whole-hearted satisfaction in our Revolutionary Army.

On this occasion, what do we have to repay our heroes? All those heroes, the male and female combatants and the cadres of our Revolutionary Army who sacrificed their lives bravely for the cause of national and people's liberation and our Revolutionary Army that is now fulfilling its missions of defending the country and building the country, in particular defending the country along the land and sea borders and in the interior of the country -- What do we have to repay our Army? On this issue, let me inform you as follows:

First, in order to repay our Revolutionary Army, in a May 1975 meeting the Central Committee of the Party and the Military Committee of the Party Center, one month after the liberation of the entire country, the Party Center and the Military Committee decided that to build a stone monument or a palace as a symbol of the lofty heroism of all our heroes, especially the heroes of our Revolutionary Army. We called it a palace to be suitable with the lofty status of our Revolutionary Army that sacrificed for the nation and the people. The site where it was to be built was Phnom Penh, the capitol city of our Democratic Kampuchea representing the entire country. What location? At the highest spot in Phnom Penh. According to the initial plans that the Party Center and the Military Committee decided and proposed that it was imperative to destroy the old construction now at Watt Phnom and organize the construction of a new palace to be the symbol of our Revolutionary Army at Watt Phnom. So then, we sited the position of the

symbol of our Revolutionary Army on the highest location in the country's capitol city of Phnom Penh.

Therefore, it is a location that we today, whether we are in the Army, are ordinary people, are male or female combatants, or whether we are young or old, can go to pay respect and study, can go to respect the souls of our comrades in arms and our cadres every single day. And later generations, one or two generations to tens of generations later, will go to study and to respect the bodies and the souls of our heroes and heroines here in the capitol city. This is our repayment to our Army. On this issue, there remains only the time to make the preparations to do it well. The draftsmen are getting ready to go through the Party Center and the Military Committee to gradually make preparations for construction. Up until now, we have not yet built it because we have many urgent issues to sort out, sorting out and stabilizing the livelihood of the people. However, starting now we are gradually preparing for the operations of the project.

In tandem with our repayment by building a palace for our Revolutionary Army, we have another task to repay our debt to our Army: all of us, whether we are in the Army or outside the Army, must make an absolute pledge before the Party flag, before the national flag, and before the lost souls of our troops and people. I say before our Party and our Party flag, the Party flag represented the leadership of our Revolutionary Organization successive until victory. It was a combat flag, a flag of bravery until we seized the huge, magnificent, world-wide victory. We pay our respects before the Party flag.

In the same sense, I say before the national flag of Democratic Kampuchea. It is no ordinary flag. Our flag, the red background with the spire symbol, is the symbol of our traditions. This flag was born from very long struggles. So then, it is a flag of bravery, a flag that appeared because of the fresh blood of our people and of our Army. And I say we make a resolution to the lost souls of our people and our troops because the sacrifices of our people and the sacrifices of our troops have been indescribably profound.

So then, before the Party flag, before the national flag of Democratic Kampuchea, and before the lost souls of our ancestors, we resolve to continue the traditions of our heroes who fought bravely in the past. We will continue to fulfill all of their revolutionary missions well and absolutely and fulfill the revolutionary missions in this new period, the missions of continuing to carry our socialist revolution, to build socialism, and to defend our country well. If we fulfill these missions with a high spirit of responsibility by concentrating on making the best decisions and assumptions, we all can fully repay our debts to our heroes. This is our pledge. Now we pledge to strengthen and expand our revolution. And whenever we carry out activities of any type, large or small, we fight; we fight using this pledge as a force to push us. We will take this pledge before the Party flag; we will take this pledge before the national flag; we take this pledge before the lost souls of our heroes, as an impetus to push each of us more and more strongly. And whenever we are happy or we are troubled about any issue, we take this pledge to strengthen our missions and do them better. By doing this, we will fulfill our mission of repaying our debts to our heroes, the combatants and cadres of our Revolutionary Army,



well and excellently, and the drops of blood that our Revolutionary Army has sacrificed will not have been shed uselessly: those drops of blood will have become a mighty revolutionary force. This is because that blood will be a force pushing our Revolutionary Army to be even stronger, pushing our Party and pushing our people to be stronger in the fulfillment of the revolutionary missions of the new era.

For what do we fulfill revolutionary missions in this new era? To eradicate forever the state of having been a slave for centuries. We liberated the country from this state of slavery on 17 April 1975. We liberated our people permanently on 17 April 1975. However, after this liberation, does the enemy want to take back our country and make us their slaves again? They do. The names outside the country, the enemies inside the country, the imperialist enemies, the enemies of every other type, and the various exploiting class enemies all carry out activities to tame our country and make us slaves again, to take our people, our workers and our peasants, and make them slaves again. So then, for what do we continue to fulfill our missions?

So that during the new era and for hundreds and thousands of years, for ten thousand years, for one hundred thousand years, we will be able to defend Democratic Kampuchea and defend of the collective Kampuchean worker-peasants forever. When we fulfill our missions like this, the external enemies will not be able to take Democratic Kampuchea; the internal enemies will not be able to take Democratic Kampuchea and take back the workers and peasants as their slaves forever. This is the meaning of fulfilling our missions well.

In tandem with this, we fulfill our missions well for the honor of our nation that for thousands of years was debased and in a state of slavery. Inside the country, we were slaves; outside the country, we were slaves. Slaves in the sense that our country was a slave and our people were slaves. Now, we have an independent country, and independent people, and the worker-peasant people have freedom. Is this an honor? It is an honor. The great victory of 17 April 1975 was the great victory of our nation, our people, and our Army. We must maintain this honor. We must strengthen and expand this honor and not let it weaken, not let it disappear. If enemies from outside come to seize back Democratic Kampuchea, this honor would dissolve. Or if the remnants of the various exploiting classes inside the country come to seize our state power, this honor will disappear.

So then, the fulfillment of our missions is on one hand a repayment of our debts to the combatants and cadres who gave their lives in the past; on the other hand, it is to protect the nation's honor and our people's honor forever. This is the first item that I wanted to inform you about, our impressions on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of our Revolutionary Army.

## **II. A brief history of the founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea**

In October 1970, the Party Central Committee held a plenary assembly for the first time. Let me inform you that it was the first plenary because before the coup we only gathered in non-plenary meetings because each comrade lived in their individual Zones and only 70, 80, or 90 percent of us could be present. This was because communication was very difficult. Some were in the Northeast; some were in the East; some were in the Southwest; and some were in the North. So then, contact was difficult because of strong enemy activities. However, by October 1970 we all met for the first time to ready strategy and tactics to fight the American imperialists and their servants, the contemptible Nol being the ringleader. At that time, we decided to take many historical measures which I have previously told you about. During this assembly, the Party Center determined that based on the enemy situation and our situation, we had the advantage over the enemy in terms of politics and we were gaining further advantage. We had the possibility of total victory within four to five years. We made this determination this in 1970. I have mentioned this issue once or twice already. We implemented the decision of the Party Center during October 1970 to win within four to five years. The decision of the Party to win within four to five years was concrete fact. We won on 17 April 1975, exactly five years later. I want to tell you this so that you will see that this first meeting had a major historical significance. How was the organization of the strategy and tactics of waging people's war successfully done? And it was during this assembly that the Party Central Committee made one other special determination, designating 17 January 1968 as the date of the founding of our Revolutionary Army. How did we make this determination and why did the Party Center decide to take 17 January 1968 as the date of the founding of our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea? I will tell you chronologically, as follows:

17 January 1968 was the first day that our Covert Guard Units transformed into individually organized guerilla units. There were not many, only four to ten to twenty in Battambang in the Northwest Zone. They were organized into guerilla units and equipped with weapons already in hand to go attack an enemy position for the first time throughout the country. They opened fire for the first time on 17 January 1968 to strike an enemy position at Bay Dâmram Village. Let me tell you that Bay Dâmram Village was located along the Steung Sangkae tributary about ten or eleven kilometers above Battambang City. Our guerilla units attacked and smashed that position and seized enemy weapons to use themselves. These were the first sounds of gunfire on the opening stage of revolutionary war against the reactionaries and the servants of the imperialists in our Kampuchea. Beginning with this, war exploded throughout the country. It exploded during January 1968 in Battambang, as I said, at Bay Dâmram. In February it exploded in the Southwest. In March it exploded in the East, the Northeast, the North, and throughout the country, what we call the 1968-1969 civil war up until the March 1970 coup. So then, war first broke out on 17 January 1968 at Bay Dâmram Village in Battambang Province. We took this historic day as the birth date of our Revolutionary Army. This is one thing I want to tell you.

Next, I wish to inform you that opening fire on 17 January 1968 was not an accident due to two, four, or ten individuals persuading one another to gather and attack the enemy as a game. The opening of fire on 17 January 1968 and subsequently throughout the country emerged from the national struggle and the class struggle of our people under the leadership of our Party, the use of revolutionary political and armed violence. The strategic line of the Party that was set in 1960 when the determination was made that it was imperative to attack and bring down the imperialists in Kampuchea, especially the American imperialists. It was imperative to attack and bring down the feudalists, capitalists, and reactionaries in Kampuchea. In order to attack, our revolutionary forces had to be built. The important thing was to build our own Revolutionary Army. To attack the enemy, the imperialists and the exploiting classes, we could not attack bare-handed. We had to attack by using political violence and use armed violence. This is because the enemy was armed. This was the correct line. The Party made this determination in 1961 when we organized the Covert Guards. This is the history of our Army.



**During this 1977 dry season, the peasants in our cooperatives in the North Zone resolve to increase their spirit of combat to overcome every obstacle in order to the water problems and increase rice production even beyond the 1976 level.**

**In this photo the peasants in the Svay Teap Subdistrict Cooperative are on a mighty offensive putting up a dam to construct a reservoir.**

These Covert Guards embedded inside the villages and base areas as well as in the cities. Some were armed with guns, but primarily we armed them with hatchets, machetes, clubs, and stones. This was what was called the use of violence. They had the mission of protecting cadres, protecting the people, and attacking and smashing government intelligence agents and the vicious enemies that were wrecking the revolution. The Covert Guards with these missions were all youths. Workers, peasants, and ordinary laborers. From what I know, some of the comrade division secretaries here used to be in these Covert Guards. They were both messengers and covert bodyguards accompanying cadres and protecting cadres. As for the uniform of our Covert Guards at that time, they each had just one pair of shorts and a kerchief. Aside from that, they had a gun. These guns were the guns that enemy had armed the people with. These Covert Guards came into existence successively, and in general they protected our cadres well. But a number of these Covert Guards were exposed to dangers, the primary dangers being in 1962 in the East Zone where a number of our Covert Guards and cadres were captured. In 1962, there were a number of major situation and events when they captured us. The combatants fulfilling missions at the time were all Covert Guards protecting cadres, protecting working locations, protecting conference sites, and couriering letters. This was very dangerous. Our cadres had to walk from village to village. Our cadres could not have stayed alive were it not for the Covert Guards' protection at that time; the enemy would have smashed them all. However, these Covert Guards grasped the situation in the villages and subdistricts, grasped the enemy military situation, and grasped the enemy police situation. The Covert Guards knew all the rules about how the enemy soldiers and police played cards and drank alcohol. The Covert Guards has a total grasp on which paths the enemy walked and which paths the enemy did not walk. The Covert Guards led the way. If the important cars all had weapons, where did the weapons come from? They were militia weapons that the Covert Guards controlled. They used the enemy's weapons to protect us. If the enemy saw them, the Covert Guards took on the appearance of enemy guards. But in fact, they protected our cadres and protected our base areas and allowed them to gradually strengthen and expand. So then, the mission of our Army at that time was a very lofty one. Like I just told you, they had just one pair of shorts and a kerchief. No matter where they had to accompany the cadres, they went. These are some examples of our Covert Guards. Whether they lived or died, they fought absolutely. And what guns did they have? Nothing beyond muskets at best. However, at that time just having a gun at all was being strong. So then, important cadres walking to work were very intimate with these Covert Guards who guaranteed their safety very well. From year to year, we successively strengthened the Covert Guards. So then, from 1961 until 1966 our revolutionary base areas throughout the country in every Zone all had Guard units, at least three-man groups. These Covert Guards were the core of our future army.

In 1966, the state of contradiction between revolution and counter-revolution grew stronger. So, the Party Center decided that the situation in Kampuchea had developed into stronger and stronger antagonistic contradiction and into sharp life-and-death contradiction. The Party had to prepare to use weapons to attack the enemy. Had we not used weapons, the enemy would have been able to smash the revolution. So, we raised the line of having to prepare to strike with weapons. The Party made the

determination that the Covert Grads had to be organized into guerilla units. So, our Covert Guards all become guerillas. The Covert Guards born during this movement were good. The Covert Guards were close to the people. Class struggle and national struggle were tense and complicated, so they were trained. In 1967, gunfire broke out in Battambang; if I remember correctly in early 1967. This gunfire broke out without any circular instruction from the Party Center. Weaponry had not yet been completely readied. The Party Center met and decided to delay for a while. At the time it was exploding in Battambang in Samlaut, Kranhoung, Phnom Veay Chap, and along the road from Battambang to Pailin. Our Party agreed to delay for a while and set up the preconditions for attacking throughout the country. We did we delay? Because if the Northwest attack alone, the enemy would have concentrated major forces to the Northwest and the Northwest would not have been able to deal with that. The defaulters would have been serious. Our line of attack was to attack throughout the country. When there was people's war throughout the country, the enemy would not be able to catch their breath. The enemy would not know what forces to use to attach which place. Based on the situation, the Party had Battambang delay for a while, delay in early 1967. Our political struggle was also strong in that era. In early 1968 on 17 January, we opened fire in Battambang. The Covert Guards of the Northwest attacked the enemy position at Bay Dâmram. In February in the Southwest there were demonstrations throughout the Zone. The Southwest Zone seized the most weapons because they held demonstrations. As I recall, they got more than 200 guns. Two hundred guns in those days was not just a few. That was very strong, because the North seized four guns and the Northeast seized just seven. As for the East, I can't remember, but they seized approximately four to ten weapons because the enemy had gathered them up in advance. So then, we had few guns. The Northwest had a few. The Northeast seized a few, as did the East and the North. Only the Southwest seized a lot, the most. Regardless, the decisive issue was not guns. It was that we all had to attack. As I said, in January we attacked in the Northwest and in February we attacked in the Southwest. So, the enemy was unable gathered its forces to attack the Northwest since the Southwest was also on the attack. When the East exploded too, the enemy had to split up its forces to strike the East. Then the Northeast attacked too, and the enemy had to split up its forces to strike the Northeast. The North attacked too, and the enemy had to split up its forces to strike the North. By April 1968, we were waging guerilla war in 17, almost all, of the 19 provinces throughout the country. Guerilla war spread to 17 of the 19 provinces throughout the country. We did not have many weapons, but we attacked throughout the country and we caused the enemy to have a contradiction between gathering and splitting forces. Their primary forces in that era included more than 30,000 personnel. Including the police, called the Royal Police in that era their forces totaled 60,000 personnel. Could 60,000 personnel attack our revolutionary guerilla units through the country? In this situation, the Party's assessment was that they could not attack us. It was just us attacking them. What I want to say is that our setting the date of 17 April 1968 as the founding date of our Revolutionary Army was not a random matter, not a fabrication. It was born from successive systematic struggle movements following the strategic and tactical lines and our successive activities, the creation of the Covert Guards and their transformation into guerilla units, the opening stage in Battambang, and the attacks throughout the country to wage people's war throughout the country and the enemy not being able to deal with it. If it had been

random, if we had attacked riskily without any planning, strategy, or tactics, the enemy would have attacked and broken us in a stroke. Why were they unable to break us? Because we had made systematical preparations. Let me clarify that this Army was born of clear preparations and strategic and tactical lines and had been organized as an army since the covert era and subsequently was tested until it appears as the army it is today. So then, our Army emerged from a very strong movement. At that time, the power-holding classes they would fight us until our tongues hung out. They prepared their strategy like this: they fought us in the 1968 dry season and attempted to deprive us of water, to dry us out until our tongues hung out. They imagined that we had no drinking water. They took any locations that they thought had water. But they did not know our Kampuchean geography. They did not know Kampuchea's drinking water as well as we did, because we went everywhere. We went to the mountains, the flatlands, the tributaries, the swamps and lakes: we went everywhere. We were in all the mountain valleys. Who lived there? Our people, our Guards, our messengers, our cadres all lived there. Their soldiers, their district chiefs, their provincial governors, their military staff, none of them knew. They knew only Phnom Penh; they know only the provincial towns. They did not know what locations had water was and what locations did not.

We made the determination that we would ready strategy and tactics to attack them until their tongues hung out and not let them do the same to us. By 1969, their tongues were hanging out. In 1969, when they opened large scale operations in Ratanakiri, we hit them until their tongues hung out. It was not us who had our tongues hanging out: it was them.

In the East, we not only hit them at Anlung Troes in the vicinity of Daun Tei, our base area. We hit them at Kandal Chrum, at Kraek. These were our tactics. We did not hit back at them in defense; we were on the offense. When we hit them from the front, the enemy was unable to hit us from the rear. A good offense is the best defense. An example: In the East, to defend Daun Tei and Anlung Troes, our support bases, we had to attack not only there at those places, but all the way to Highway 7.

When we fought like this, the enemy had no forces to come hit us from the rear. They came to block us at the front. They were in a defensive position at everywhere. In the East, in the Southeast, they had no time to pound us from the rear. It was the same in the Northeast. This was the line of defense by going on the offense, an offensive defense.

Our weapons were weak, our people were few; but, the Party's line of guerilla warfare was correct and we were strong. The people who correctly implement the Party's line were through who had passed through the movements, the Covert Guard movement that was tempered in the movement who grasped the Party's line of guerilla warfare well. It was these people who were the guerilla commanders, the cores of our later-day Revolutionary Army. This is the history of the Army. So then, this Army did not emerge from any military academy – it emerged from the successive struggle movements, from bare hands. It was these people who agreed with the Party's line and were able to grasp the Party's line. It was these people who implanted the line. Bare-handed, they fought; with muskets, they fought; with few guns, they fought. From fighting like that, this Army

has become very strong. An army that only knows how to fight fully-armed is not strong. An army expounded from being bare-handed and became a revolutionary movement and expanded time and time again, is a mighty army. When we won on 17 April, the world was very shocked. Now, they are still shocked.

So then, our Army is mighty. This is the history of our Army. We must see the power of our Army in order to be proud of our Army and be pleased with our Army and to strengthen and expand and care for our Army. If not, if we see our Army as being backward and weak, and just see that others have aircraft and artillery and everything as see them as being stronger than us, we have not examined the true nature and the fruits of our victories. When we defeated the Americans, did we have aircraft? We must remember this. We must remember this in later years; we must remember this in the year 1980, in 1990, in 2000, in 3000. When we defeated the American imperialists, the largest in the world, did we have aircraft? No! We had no ships either. We had no armor. Artillery, we did have little, trophies of war.

This Army had no aircraft, no armor, no artillery, no ammunition, but we fought and won. It is imperative to hang on to the memory of these times of successive great victories. Why? To see the strength of this Army, its strong points, its strong ideology, strong politics, strong organization, strong combat line, and correct combat line.

Next, I want to clarify some additional views. Why did we not take some other date as the founding date of our Army?

This point must be clarified. In truth, the presentation a moment ago was very clear. However, this issue must be further clarified so there will be even more faith regarding the founding of our Army.

Let me tell you that the reason we took 17 January 1968 as the date of the founding of our Revolutionary Army is because on this date our Army opened fire for the first time, and this Army was created under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The previous armies were not created under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea; and, not being the army of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, they were defeated.

An example: Our country has a 2,000-year history. In that 2,000-year history, there were the following societal periods:

The original Kampuchean society was a slave society with two classes. One class was the slave owners; the other class was the slaves. The slave owners exploited them. The exploited slaves rebelled and fought back. Slave armies fought the slave owners time and time again. However, they were defeated. These armies were defeated. This was one period.

Another period was the peasant slave society. The exploiters were the peasant masters. The exploited were the peasant slaves. The exploited organized armies to struggle against the exploiters, but they were defeated.

The third period was the feudal period. There were two classes. One was the feudalist landowners. The other was the peasantry. The feudalist landowners exploited the peasantry, and the peasants organized their armies to fight the feudalist landowners, but they were defeated. In 1863, the French imperialists arrived. Was there a struggle? There were lots of them: Pouthi Kâmbao, Achar Svar, Vises Nhauv, and Kralao Haom Kuong. However, these armies were defeated; they did not win against the French. This was because they had no Party leadership and they had no correct line.

From 1946 until 1954, there was a struggle against the French imperialists. We had an army; it fought hard. However, in the 1954 Geneva Agreements they scribbled just a line saying that the struggle of the Kampuchean people had to cease. Just one scribble, and the army had to demobilize and go back to climbing palm trees and pedaling pedicabs, or whatever. We ask: Why was that? It was because there was no Party in the lead; there were no strategic and tactical lines; there was no military line; there was no line of people's war with our Party in the lead. This is why this army demobilized like this. They dissolved and demobilized themselves to fall into the hands of the enemy.

However, beginning in 1960, when the Party had a strategic line and a tactical line including making ready for revolutionary violence and setting up an army, what happened? Bare hands in 60, in 61, 62, 63 ... 67, bare hands. The Covert Guards. Gunfire exploded in 1968, like I said. In 1968-1969, war exploded and we were bare-handed. Inside the country, the power-holding classes gathered their forces to fight us. Outside the country, there was just us. The enemy inside the country struck and smashed us: they hit politically and with weaponry. In 1968-1969, you comrades know this already, how they fought us. But did we stop? No! Why not? Because the line of our Party stated that we had to fight, and the Party assessed the state of contradictions between us and the enemy, and saw that armed struggle was imperative. Had we not waged armed struggle, the revolutionary forces would have been smashed and left bare-handed again. The previous struggles against the French were done bare-handed. In 1954, we were bare-handed. Now we struggled again. If we stopped, we would not just be left bare-handed: they would have cut our throats. Previously they had cut plenty of throats, but this time they would cut them all. So then, we did not stop. No matter what the difficulties, we did not stop. Regardless of what anyone said, we did not stop. The entire Party was in unity that we had to fight. Our stance was to fight on. It was like that in the Southwest. It was like that in the Northeast. It was like that everywhere. We fought on. We were bare-handed, but we dared to fight on. This Army did not die. This Army was not defeated. It made more and more progress and gradually grew large. In 1968, the Covert Guard became guerilla units, guerilla squads, platoons, and companies. In 1970, we already had companies. The Army did not scatter; it was not defeated. Why was that? Because the line of the Party leadership was correct. Immediately after the 1970 coup, we fought with independence and mastery. We built our Army with independence and mastery. Had we relied upon foreign countries, would our Army have grown large like that? Would we have defeated



the American imperialists? Without independence and mastery, would we have been able to continue the fight in 1973? No! Immediately after the coup we built our Army independently. General speaking, it was like this. In 1973, teher were the Paris Agreements, and Vietnam stopped, Laos stopped; many countries throughout the world tried to coerce us to stop. But the Party made the determination not to stop; we would fight on. We were in complete agreement to fight on and the fight was not risky. This fight had a strong possibility of victory. Had we stopped for one month, the enemy would have caught their breath and strengthened and expanded their forces. But we attacked constantly and the enemy had no chance to strengthen and expand forces. We fought on. We did not stop. We were happy to fight on alone. Whether anyone helped us or not was not an issue, because our line was we were determined to fight on. Our reasoning was that in our situation we had to fight to be able to stay alive. Had we not fought, we would have been slaves. It was the only path. But if we fought, there was just the path of life, not death. It was difficult, both there was just the path to life; there as not path to death. The Party line stated this clearly. The entire Army was in unity. The stance of the Party was unified. The east, the Southwest, the Northwest, the Northeast, the North, they all sent in telegrams saying that we absolutely had to fight on with no accommodation, no backing up, no negotiation. We agreed to fight on.

Were it not for the Party in the lead, if there had been no correct line to lead the Army to fight and wage people's war, this Army certainly would have been defeated. For this reason, we did not take any other day, month, or year as the founding date of our Revolutionary Army other than 17 January 1968. This is because there was no other day, month, and year when the Party was in the lead. It was because on 17 January 1968 the Party led the Army and there were correct strategic and tactical lines, a military line, the line of people's war and the combat line that victory was achieved like this. This was the reasoning of our setting the birth date of our Revolutionary Army. These were our beliefs. The reason was very clear.

Grasping the history of the creation of the Army, we see the power and see the strength of our Revolutionary Army; if we strengthen and expand the Army in this direction, no enemy will be able to attack us. Our Army does not commit aggression against anyone, but when any country that comes to commit aggression against us, our Army and our people will fight for as many years as it takes. Standing upon this line, if we had had aircraft, ships, armor, artillery but had not had the line of people's war and did not stand upon the military line of the Party, we would not have been as strong as the Army was when we fought the American imperialists, not as strong as when we had no aircraft, armor, or ships. Thus, it is imperative to think back to the time that we fought the American imperialists, what the circumstances were, what materials there were, what the ideology and politics were. It is imperative to examine the true nature of this Army.

### **III. A number of views regarding the military lines of our Party, the line of people's war and the combat line of our Party**

This issue is primarily related to comrades on the military side.

The objective is raised on this occasion because we are celebrating the anniversary of our Revolutionary Army. So then, we raise a number of military issues. Others non-military cadres must also understand and grasp these issues.

We remind you of them so that you will grasp them and subsequently implement them.

#### **1. Regarding the military organizational line of the Party:**

The military organizational line of our Party is to build the Army inside the mass movements, not to build the Army separately from the revolutionary movements of the masses. We build the Army inside the revolutionary movements of the masses under the leadership of the Party.

So that is why the determination was made that the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea is the pure dictatorial instrument of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to serve the Kampuchean revolution and the Kampuchean people. Building the Army is not contrary to the lines of the Party or contrary to the interests of the workers and peasants.

Our Army is not a technical Army. It is the revolutionary political army of the worker class serving the Kampuchean nation and the Kampuchean people, the workers and peasants.

Building contrary to this would be incorrect. This Army is very strong. Now and in the future, a number of you comrades are going and will go to the aviation side. There are enough aircraft now, and shortly we will have jet aircraft. Even though they are jet aircraft, the comrades using the aircraft do not base themselves on technology; they stand on revolutionary fundamentals, stand on the Party line, in using those aircraft. It is the same with armor. It is the same with artillery. They serve Democratic Kampuchea and serve the collective worker-peasant people. Comrades responsible for each branch must educate on this issue, in particular in aviation. Our aircraft are not stronger than American aircraft, even the jets. But when the pilots are strong, our aircraft are truly far stronger than the enemy's aircraft.

An example: In May 1975, the American used the ships of their 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet to pound and take Koh Tang. Their President Ford personal led the attack against us. There were tremendous numbers of helicopters and artillery. They bombed and bombarded Koh Tang to bits before they landed their ships and helicopters and transported their troops to Koh tang Island. At the time we had only one platoon there, and few weapons. When the bombed and bombarded we did not fight: we waited for them. When they came, we

struck them and smashed and killed more than 200 of them. Their soldiers were extremely cowardly. When we shot at them and wounded them, they only were concerned with evacuating their wounded.

So then, that our Army is very strong is not because of weaponry. Even though we have the techniques and have more and more weaponry, we must build our revolutionary political, ideological, and organizational stances and make them strong. When equipped with these stances, this Army is very strong.

An example: We set up the plan to attack and cut off Neak Loeung and attack and cut off Phnom Penh at the same time. The Army requested H-107 rockets, but there were none; they requested artillery rounds, but there were none. Each battlefield gathered up 100 to 200 artillery rounds. Ammunition for smaller weapons was also insufficient.

The Army had clear faith in the Party, and had the political and ideological stance of attacking and winning. Really, it was not the weapons: it was the politics and ideology of absolute attack. This is one thing. Another thing was having the correct combat line. So weaponry was not the decisive factor.

Our Army was born just nine years ago. It fought and defeated the 200-year-old American army. So now and in the future, we are building and will build our Army like this: it will train inside the revolutionary movements. Do not fear hardships. Only by training in the movements can experience be gained. We must build our cadres like this.

The line of our Party is to fight day and night, dry season and rainy season, and not let the enemy catch its breath. During twelve months, we fight the enemy for twelve months. We fight them day and night. We fight them in every style: fight them using guerilla tactics; fight them during the rainy season and the dry season. Do not let the enemy catch its breath. We don't have very many weapons; however, we are prepared to fight like that. We mount major attacks in the dry season. In the rainy season we split our forces and mounted small-scale but constant attacks. So then, in one year, twelve months, we fight for twelve months. Our Army is very strong. Later on, will we be able to fight the aggressors, anyone who dares to commit aggression against Kampuchea? Will they be able to stay in our country? Do not let them rest for twelve months. If they stay for twelve months, fight them for twelve months. If they stay for 24 months, fight them for 24 months. If they stay for three years, fight them all the time. They will not be able to stay. But fighting like this, fighting twelve months a year like this, that can only be done when combat lines are correct, only when we are brave and when our revolutionary stances are brave. Let me add that now in terms of materials and technology, our Army has made much progress. This is one of our good points. But, these factors are not decisive. The revolutionary ideology of our Army is the decisive factor.

So then, the organizational line, the line of building our military still relies on politics and still relies on ideology; it does not rely on technology. We will keep on strengthening technology based upon political fundamentals. When technology grows

stronger, ideology also grows stronger. But if technology gets stronger while ideology gets weaker, the Army would get weaker. This rule must be examined.

Think about our organizational line. What must the building of one unit, the building of one combatant, the building of one cadre or five be based upon? To be able to do this, the entire Party must grasp this line. This is first. Second, the Military Committee must grasp this line. Third, the General Staff must grasp this line. The entire Party, the entire country, every Zone, every location, including the Party inside each unit, must grasp this line. The Committees in the division, regiments, and battalions and the Branches in the companies must grasp this line. When the Party grasps this line and absorbs this line, the divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies are very strong. We will continue to implement our military line like this.



**In tandem with the progress in leaps and bounds in terms of revolutionary politics, ideology organization, our heroic Revolutionary Army is making progress on the technical side too. This photograph: Boys in the Revolutionary Army's naval forces at Chroy Changwar are skillfully repairing old boat and ship engines and putting the back into operation.**

## 2. Regarding the Party's line of people's war:

We have a clear line of people's war. To wage people's war victoriously we must concentrate on the following several issues:

We remind you of these issues so that you grasp them and implement them correctly. We seize victory by implementing these combat lines very correctly.

a. **Attacking the enemy politically:** Taking just one example, capturing the people. Throughout the world, they never capture the people. Our line was to capture the people: one, we took him; two, we took them; 100, we took them; 1,000, we took them, and so on until we captured the people from Phnom Penh too. The line of taking away the people from the enemy was very correct. This never happened in the world. When the enemy has the people, the enemy has an army and an economy. When the enemy has no people, the enemy has no military and no economic strength. Our reasoning is correct. Thus, our line is very correct. We fight to capture the people at every location.

An example: The fighting in Banam in 1973. We took everyone in Banam Town, expelling the ethnic Vietnamese, the ethnic Chinese, the military, the police; we took everyone, taking away the people from the enemy.

An example: The fighting on Highway 6, Chenla II, 1971. The enemy intended to take everything from Taing Kouk to Kampong Thom. They cut off everything from Kampong Thmâ to Kreung and used this triangle to capture the people and round up the people for use as a political force and an economic force to seize the North Zone adjacent to Kratie so that the contemptible Thiêu's forces could attack from the south and take Kratie. However, they were defeated. Why was that? Because we pulled out the people. When all the people were pulled out, they gained no additional forces. They had no additional strength in terms of economics or manpower. They grew even weaker. We attacked and cut them to pieces, cutting off the heads and tails of their main-force units and creating the preconditions for the decisive attack. The decisive factor in the victory: we pulled out the people.

An example: We liberated Oudong in 1974. We pulled out all the people. When they took it back, they had no forces. They had no forces of the people; they had no economic or military strength. We were able to fight them and we did not even have to fight them. When we made the decisive attack on Phnom Penh, we let them be, and we attacked to the front instead.

This is a very important strategic line: control the people and capture the people. That's why our Party members, our combatants, the state power in the base areas do anything that impacts the people they must understand the strategic meaning of the people in this way: whatever side has the people, that side wins, whether they are strategic people or tactical people. When the tactical people are with us, they help us. But when the tactical people are with the enemy, they help the enemy.

So then, in the work of defending the country at present and later on, it is important to have a grasp on the people. That is why the Party concentrates on grasping the cooperatives. The core work during this year of 1977 is strengthening and expanding the cooperatives and making them strong by building the cooperatives and by building

1. There must be a party that is politically, ideologically, and organizationally firm. If there is a party, but that party is not strong, not firm, it cannot lead a people's war: it will be defeated.

In the past, why were we able to seize victory? Because the Party had the correct line, had an absolute ideology, and had correct organization. There is no need for a lot of explanation of this issue. Correct organization is not matter of numbers; it is a matter of quality. When we set up the plan for the decisive attack in mid 1974 to prepare for 1975, we agreed to close the doors to the Party and not expand the Party to prevent the enemy from entering. If the enemy had entered, our Army would not have been strong. Thus, the numbers were small, but we were very strong. What I want to say is when organization is correct, it is clean. This is the first thing is having a clean Party.

2. It is imperative that the people be strong. A broad front relying on the workers and peasants with the forces of the workers and peasants as a support. In the past, we gathered up all forces. We had a Kampuchean National Unification Front, but what was the foundation? The workers and peasants under the leadership of the Party. The Party's Army was a fundamental force of the Party. The cooperatives of the Party were a fundamental force of the Party. The cooperatives were the worker-peasant alliance forces of the Party. The Army was the instrument of the Party, the force of the Party. So then, our front was strong and was a vast force that we could gather up. However, we were able to build and strengthen our core forces, among which the cooperatives played a very important role. Without the cooperatives, we would not have been able to seize victory. So then, our people were strong, strong in terms of serving forward battlefield, strong in terms of serving the rear battlefield. I wish to raise this issue so that both in the present and in the future we must concentrate on doing political work, ideological work, and organizational work to care for the forces of our people, concentrate on our people, and not negatively impact our people. Do whatever can be done to seize the maximum forces of the people, because our Army was born of the people and is the child of the people. It is like that now and will be like that in the future. When the people are good, our Army will absolutely be good; but, a people of the worker-peasant category, a people that is a helpful force. In each period it was like that. We rely upon a class line. But, we try to gather up everyone, any forces that can be gathered up. But, we rely upon class, rely upon the collective workers and peasants following the Party's class stance.

3. Waging people's war requires having a strong army. Without a strong army, there can be no people's war. There must be a strong army.

4. To wage people's war victoriously, there must be a self-supporting economy. Without a self-supporting economy, war cannot be waged. We would be unable to resolve economic problems either during war or afterwards. There are difficulties, but we can sort them out. During the war we never transported rice in from overseas; not one bag, not one grain, came in from outside. During the war, we were able to be self-supporting. This is first. Second, we even sold to foreign countries. That was during the war. Another issue in waging people's war is that we must have friends in the world.

were able to sort out the economy. After the war we also had difficulties, but comparatively, we were able to sort them out. Can we sort them out now? Can we implement the Party's regime? From the reports at the beginning of this month and our going to look at every base area, we see that all regimes have been carried out. Like I told you previously in the school, you comrades have already absorbed this, and in a word, we eat 312 kilograms per person per year. So this is a very high level. We are holding in reserve two bushels per person in 1977. In tandem with this, we have enough left over to export 150,000 to 200,000 tons of paddy. So, that is very strong.

We did 100 percent of our own agriculture. During the war it was like that. We must maintain this tradition; we must maintain this stance; we must strengthen this stance in order to build the country strongly. And in times of war the economy had to be even stronger because we were more experienced and had additional forces.

5. Another issue in waging people's world is that we must have international friends. It is imperative to have international friends helping and supporting morally, politically, and diplomatically to prevent the enemy from being able to isolate us. How do they support? They support our struggle, and when enemies commit aggression against us, they support us: they denounce the enemies. We must have friends. That's why during wars in the past we have had very many friends. Now too, we have many friends, because now even though one or two imperialists curse us, almost the entire world recognizes us. We will keep trying to make more friends. Making lots of friends is not diplomatic work, not primary diplomatic activities. Primarily it is subjective factors, the revolutionary factors inside the country. We defend the country well, build the country well, and everyone wants to get to know us and contact us.

These are the decisive factors in making many friends in the world: defending the country well, building the country well. Just by doing this, wherever the Foreign Ministry goes things are easy because in power and influence of the revolution grows and prospers. We keep on trying.

In the people's war we have just been describing, there are general aspects that the entire Party must grasp and implement well. So then, waging people's war does not just build the Army: it builds the forces of the Party, builds the forces of the people, builds the forces of the Army, builds the economy, and builds various international friendly forces too.

This is revolutionary dialectical materialism, because everything is connected.

### 3. Regarding a number of combat lines:

First, attack the enemy militarily. Attack the enemy politically; attack the enemy economically; attack the enemy with a strong military movement; and attack the enemy by eradicating their war of espionage, their psychological warfare, and their pacifist agents.

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the Party Branches in the cooperatives to 100 percent level during 1977, making the cooperatives into iron walls throughout the country. Making the cooperatives into iron walls means that the people are strong and nothing at all can penetrate. This is the meaning of grasping the people. The political meaning is like this.

b. **Attacking the enemy economically:** Our slogan is: *Attack the enemy economy, surround the enemy economy, cut-off the enemy's economy, and cut-off the enemy's food supply.* During the war, we had the enemy's economy in our hands, and we did not sell food supplies to the enemy. So then, the enemy had no rice, no food. The enemy soldiers had no food. The people in the enemy zone had no food. The American had to transport rice in from their country to feed the traitors. The Party assumed that when the American imperialists made war in Kampuchea by transporting rice here from their country, they could not defeat us: when all the strategic routes were cut-off and the Mekong River was cut-off, they would surely lose. Though we had little ammunition and our forces were few, we fought and won because we struck the enemy in every field both military and political, and we cut-off the enemy's economy.

c. The next issue about which I wish to inform you is the issue of mobilizing enemy soldiers that we carried out during our people's war. The issue of mobilizing enemy soldiers was a tactical issue to weaken the enemy in terms of morale and break the enemy ranks so the enemy would not have the troop strength to counter us and attack us. This was the objective of mobilizing enemy soldiers. There are many ways to mobilize enemy soldiers. However, on this occasion I wish to inform you about some of the methods that we used to use which were effective. In order to be able to mobilize enemy soldiers, the primary point is that it is imperative to attack the enemy, to hit them hard to defeat them to dead-end them and to do not let them find a way out. Then we could mobilize them effectively. In our experience, we never once were able to mobilize entire platoons or companies or entire enemy positions without attacking them. We had to strike them hard in order to seize victory, and after successive victories we were then able to mobilize the enemy soldiers when they were at a dead-end. This was the most effective method. Thus, do not hope to plead with them, to do ordinary political work with them: you must attack them before you will be able to mobilize them. Attack, then mobilize; attack, then mobilize to have them come out in order to save themselves and came back to live with the people again. Koh Peam Reang on the Mekong River is proof of this. We attacked and smashed Koh Peam Reang during 1975; they were on the island, and aircraft could not help them, the navy could not help them, and the infantry could not help them. They had to surrender to us. This is one example.

Another example: Northwest of Phnom Penh, as I recall, it was at Chhouk Va. The commander at Chhouk Va was Ta Khăn. He was very stubborn; he was the right hand man of the contemptible Chan Reangsei. We attacked and surrounded them, and they had no way out. We appealed, and they agreed to surrender to us. We were able to seize these enemy soldiers because we attacked strongly. It was the same at Taing Kouk. In 1973, we attacked Taing Kouk. We attacked Highway 7 and Highway 6, and we won successive victories and isolated Taing Kouk. We were able to mobilize the one brigade that was at Taing Kou, and they surrendered to us.

These are some examples that make it clear that in order to be able to mobilize the enemy soldiers, we had to first attack them strongly, isolate them, and leave them no way out so they will surrender to us. The second method of mobilizing enemy soldiers was by mobilizing their wives, children, parents, and friends. We made propaganda and educate them to induce the enemy soldier, and we whipped up the families of the enemy soldiers to demand that their husbands or parents who are enemy was another way we mobilized enemy soldiers by inducing them away from the battlefield. There were other methods, but they were not as effective because the enemy was in a life-and-death fight and it was not easy to bring them in to us. Therefore, we did not use enemy troop mobilization as a strategy, but rather as a tactic. We used enemy soldier mobilization as secondary work to weaken the enemy to some extent in combination with fighting them. This is what I wanted to tell you about mobilizing enemy soldiers, and we achieved some results.

d. Next, there is another issue: the issue of countering and eradicating the enemy's espionage war during our people's war. During our people's war, the enemy did not just fight us militarily: they also fought us by using espionage. Their war of espionage was a strategic war in which they fought us by secretly penetrating among our people and our ranks to agitate with various propaganda doing anything possible to cause turmoil among our troops and on our battlefields. Their activities were strong in 1973. In 1974 their activities were strong. They acted strongly on both the front battlefields and the rear battlefield. I will mention just a few examples. On some battlefields where we should have won 100 percent victories, we did not win. On some battlefields where we had already won, the enemy won them back. The enemy was not strong, but they had their inside latch works: they had spies that made contact by radiotelephone. Their agents talked to us and they talked to the enemy too. This problem was everywhere; this problem was recognized. So, the enemy knew dome of our plans. I will give you some examples. On Highway 5 from Praeak Phneou to Kampong Luong, we were making preparations to attack the enemy. When we were getting ready to cross the Tonle Sap to attack, the battlefield command reported to upper echelon that now the enemy knew, that the enemy was aware and was ready to resist us, and they asked whether to attack or not. But upper echelon said to absolutely attack because the plan was not just to attack Highway 5 but to attack nationwide. Even if the attack failed, it would tie the enemy down on Highway 5. The enemy knew in advance because one or two elements had secretly penetrated our Army's ranks. Later we discovered them. This was one example. There were lots of examples. Attacking Prey Veng during 1974. We had already attacked surrounding Phnom Penh and had attacked Highway 1. We were getting ready to cut off Prey Veng in the rainy season. The plan that the Zone Standing Committee reported to upper echelon called for a 100 percent decisive attack. Comparing the enemy's forces with ours, we would be 100 percent successful because Prey Veng had been isolated for many years and had no one to help. However, they learned of the plan in advance; they made advance preparations. They knew where each of our units was located and what target it was to attack. They knew which of our units were strong and which were weak. They countered following that. So, we did not win. It was not because of any military issue; it was because the enemy knew our activities in advance. Why did they have

advance knowledge? Because of espionage. I bring up these examples. This was why we took absolute counter-espionage measures during 1974. Absolute measures were taken.

The second measure was closing the door to the entire Party and not allowing any expansion of the Party after mid 1974. In tandem with this, we did not allow any new expansion of core organizations after mid 1974. The only exception was the Army. The Party decided that the Army there could be expanded because there many had given their lives: many Party members and cadres had sacrificed their lives. Membership had to be increased to take on leadership duties. However, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating, we decided that in the Army there could be inductions of core organizations and Party Members only if Company Branches agreed, Battalion Party Committees agreed, Regimental Party Committees agreed, and Division Party Committees agreed. Four echelons had to agree. It was not like before, when a Branch agreed and a Battalion approved. Previously it had been very easy to join. This is why we raised the qualifications for joining the Party by requiring four-echelon agreement like this, to prevent the enemy from penetrating inside the Army. It was not just a Branch that examined this; it went all the way to the Division. It was not like no mistakes at all were made, but they were few. Most were correct. So then, we closed the door, and we took firm measures in mid 1974. Aside the Army, we did not allow anyone to join. This was because the enemy was attacking us, not just the Army, but in the base areas they attacked the state authorities; they attacked and joined the militias and joined the Arts, the hospitals; they joined all units, and they attacked us. So then, we took meticulous measure to counter this and we closed the door in mid 1974. This measure, according to the Party's assessment, was 70 to 80 percent effective to dealing with the enemy. We countered enemy activities and kept 70 to 80 percent of them from being able to join us. Previously, they joined as they pleased. Now, since mid 1974 when we took these measures, we have resisted them from 70 to 80 percent. So then, their forces are weak: of 100 of them who want to join, on 20 are able to join. Those 20 are unable to cause turmoil; they are unable live among us in disguise inside the Army living on the rear battlefields. So then, our measures since 1974 have been able to resolve not all of the espionage issue, but most of it and we have prevented them from joining to some extent, and we are able to use our forces to the maximum. Due to these measures, our Army was strong in late 1974 and early 1975. Our rear battlefields were strong in late 1974 and early 1975. We were able to fight the enemy because we had dealt with the enemy espionage in a timely manner. This issue was a major experience, a significant world experience. Comrades inside or outside the Army must grasp this issue now and in the future.

The enemy's espionage attacks were a very poisonous matter. When they attacked frontally, that was one thing. But their covert attacks made it difficult for us.

In many countries, the enemy is able to insert agents inside Party ranks. Thus, it becomes two parties, even three parties. Our Party is still one Party. Our Army is still one Army. The imperialists cannot enter; no enemy can.

When we opened the decisive attack on Phnom Penh, we were able to maintain secrecy. The enemy did not know. They were unable to estimate our forces. They were unable to resist us.

Had we not eradicated their espionage in a timely manner, we would not have liberated the country on 17 April 1975. The entire Party, the entire Army, must draw from this experience and attach itself to this experience past, present, and future. The enemy continues to attack us. The war facing us is a class struggle. The War of espionage is a class struggle. We must continue to fight. We must continue to have an Army. We must strengthen and expand the Army. There will still be wars; they are not over. They may be small, large, regional, or world wars. We must get ready in advance. Primarily, we must ready the view and stance of advance mastery.

#### 4. A number of combat lines:

Our first combat line is guerilla attack and combined-arms attack, taking guerilla attack as the fundamental and combined-arms attack in order to be decisive.

These are the combat lines of our Party in people's war. To wage people's war and win, there must be two types of combat: there must be large-scale combined-arms attack, but combined-arms attack and guerilla attack play different roles.

Guerilla fighting is being able to attack every day, and can be compared to fishing with a basket. Anyone can fish with a basket and get tiny shrimp. During the war, the Party said that we were to make guerilla attacks throughout the country. One guerilla team could attack the enemy and kill one enemy and wound one enemy per day. With 1,000 teams, 5,000 teams, how many enemies can we smash? Lots. This is people's war to wear the enemy out and break their morale and make the enemy crazy and in a state of turmoil.

However, guerilla war cannot achieve victory and cannot smash the enemy. Fully-equipped war must also be waged. Combined-arms forces must be used to smash hundred, thousands, and tens of thousands of the enemy and completely defeat the enemy.

Comrades leading wars in the future must implement this line. This is how we readied weaponry. We prepared combined-arms weaponry and guerilla weaponry. The guerillas were the militia units and armed people's units.

During the 1968-1969 civil war, we had no weapons. However, in the isolated villages and subdistricts, how many enemy soldiers were there? Not many, sometimes only two or three soldiers per subdistrict. With just that many of them, could our guerillas attack them? We could. Even bare-handed, we could attack. We could attack them with clubs. We could attack them with machetes, and then seize more weapons from the enemy, capture enemy soldiers, capture village chiefs, confiscate village authorities and

overthrown the old village authorities and organize new village authorities and new militias. This was the correct line of people's war. If not, if we had thought that waging a war of national liberation required reliance on this or that foreign country, that would not have worked.

In implementing guerilla war any kinds of weapons can be used. Implementing this line of war was very strong.

An example: Ratanakiri Province had 33 subdistricts. We opened fire on 30 March and during April we liberated 32 subdistricts. The enemy still had only two subdistricts. This was attacking bare-handed, using the rage of the people to attack the enemy with our bare hands and seizing weapons from the enemy.

Therefore, guerilla was is the fundamental war, our fundamental form of war. The enemy cannot deal with timely guerilla attacks together with combined-arms war. This was very effective in our war. Our implementation was correct. Fighting like this is effective. This was high-level scientific warfare, scientifically analyzing both ourselves and the enemy to prepare attack strategies and tactics. We fought like this and were able to seize the village and subdistrict state authorities. The enemy did not have the forces to take it all back, in particular the villages and subdistricts in isolated regions. This was the strategy, a brand-new experience for the world.

In the experiences of some countries in the past, they just attacked positions, platoon or company positions. It is difficult for one company of our forces to attack and take one platoon position. Our company would have only one chance in ten of taking their position. So then, this is using our weakness to attack their strength.

As for us, we did not attack positions. We attacked villages. After we had we attacked the villages, when we took four or five subdistricts, positions of one or two platoons or one company fled, and we were ready to attack them outside their positions. Our fighting like this was strong.

The second combat line was making mighty, successive attacks, day and night, rainy season and dry, so that the enemy was not able to breathe.

Some opinion may arise saying that in order to be able to attack like this, there had to be a lot of troops with lots of weapons, taking turns to attack. But, when we did not have lots of troops or weapons, we could not take turns to attack day and night, rainy season and dry, like this. There would have been problems.

But, we did not resolve things like this. We implemented our combat lines. Our guerillas attacked without getting tired. They walked patrols; they watched the enemy's standard operating procedures; and they attacked the enemy, wounding one or two and then returning home. The enemy lost heart every day. Then went they returned, the harvested rice and increased production as normal to feed their forces. Thus, the guerillas were very optimistic. They had no problems. In particular, the guerillas in isolated

regions were the fundamental class. One pair of shorts and one machete, and they were able to attack the enemy. Some locations used crossbows and bows with poison arrows. Wherever they went, they supplied that area. They dug for crabs to find their own food to support themselves with the highest independence, mastery, and self-reliance. So then, anyone was able to fight. The poor reactants and the lower-middle peasants were very skilled fighters. When they came back, they were happy and they reported. They did not think about not having weapons or ammunition or food supplies. They lived as normal. They attacked the enemy as normal. Fighting like this, they were able to fight day and night.

Our regular forces were the same. During the Five-Year War, we fought like this. In the dry season, we prepared strategic attacks on major targets. In the dry season, we fought hard with plans in order to smash enemy forces. But during the rainy season, we withdrew. We removed some forces for replenishment and studies, but we kept other forces to continue attacking. The forces of regular units split up to make guerilla attacks. The enemy did not know that we had withdrawn to replenish forces. They resist us constantly. We implemented this line everywhere. So then, we could attack in the dry season, and we could attack in the rainy season. We could both replenish our forces and attack too. The enemy could not estimate our forces. They did not know how many tens of thousands or hundreds of thousand of forces we had. Our being able to fight like this came from correct implementation of the line. Just seeing this, we see that we were strong.

The third combat line, attacking to wear-down and tire-out the enemy in order to create opportunities to smash the enemy.

To tire-out the enemy, we made guerillas attacks for a long time. When the enemy was tired-out, we assembled the Sector forces or the regular forces to go smash them.

So then, we avoided assembling forces to attack the enemy's new forces. If the enemy was at full-strength and we had made concentrated attacks, we would have used a lot of forces. Our method of attack was to tire the out first. Make them tired by successive guerilla attacks, then after a while we used major forces to attack them. When attacking like this, the chances of success are 90 percent.

So then, that's why the Party said when the enemy strikes hard, do not resist; when they strike hard and deep, their head is strong but their tail is weak. Do not attack the head; attack the tail and the flanks. Do not try to hold back the head. We attack them where they are weak to wear them down and create opportunities to smash them.

Fourth, attack small; attack big; attack medium; attack the from the front; attack from the rear; attack from the flanks; attack the tail; make special forces attacks; raid and attack and cut them to pieces; attack inside the enemy's areas and outside the enemy's areas.

We bring this up to prevent being baffled. Being able to fight like this, we fought like this. We were in a position of constant initiative. We were not baffled. We were lively.

Thought the experience of studying and learning from 1973 and 1974, our Army has confidence that will absolutely be victorious. We have many moves. Sometimes we use one, two, or three in combination. But avoid fighting the head. We instead evade to attack from the ribs and the tail of the enemy. Fighting like this, we have the advantage: the enemy cannot penetrate; we they penetrate, we intercept them. So then, we always have the initiative; the enemy chases after us; we do not chase after the enemy.


An example: Cutting them to pieces along Highway 5. Initially, we attack from the west of Kampong Chhnang. They enemy gathered forces to strike us. We moved forces to attack them south of Kampong Chhnang instead, and cut them to pieces. So then, the enemy chased after us. We made them chase us. The enemy went from strong to weak. In the East on Highway 1 east of Phnom Penh, it was the same. In 1973 along Highway 3, we attacked and cut it into segments and isolated the enemy at Tram Khnar and at Sràng, and turned them into dead forces. After we isolated them, they were unable to contact Phnom Penh and Kampong Kantuot, and we attacked at liberated the position right away. We cut them to pieces, and caused many enemy forces to become dead men, abandoned.

Our Revolutionary Army has a lot of experience that is still being compiled for study.

Fifth, attack using ancient weapons, modern weapons, and semi-modern weapons, all in combination.

Ordinarily, the enemy used artillery and armor. They used artillery first, before their infantry came. We emplaced stakes and their infantry were caught on our stakes. So then they had their armor come first, with their infantry following from the rear. But without infantry, armor cannot see anything at all. We used B-40s to smash them, and they fled back to their rear and ran over their own infantry. So then, the B-40s and the stakes were used in combination.

All this is only for us to remind us of some things about our line of people's war. Later we will recall more.



**In order to contribute to the completely successful achievement of the 1977 Plan, our revolutionary medical personnel fight to produce even more types of medications to treat diseases and to make them even more effective.**

**This group of medical personnel in Phnom Penh are organizing and storing medicines that the brothers and sisters have produced, putting them into good order so that they can be sent to the cooperatives.**



#### **IV. Regarding the mission of continuing to strengthen and expand the Revolutionary Army of our Party**

Our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, from its creation until today, has been tested many times inside the long revolutionary struggle movements to implement revolutionary rage in difficult, changing, and complicated situations of guerilla war in a framework of tense civil war and the Five-Year war of national liberation and people's liberation and bravely overcame every hardship until it seized the great victory of 17 April 1975. The Army is a high-quality army in terms of politics, ideology, and organization. It tightly grasped and implemented well the military line of the Party, the Party's line of people's war, and the combat lines of the Party before it could seize such a great victory. Our Army is a good army, one of the very best armies in the world in terms of politics, ideology, organization, and combat techniques. Up until today, this Army has been of such quality. We do not exaggerate: we do not exaggerate the quality. This is the truth.

We will speak about two proofs in order to make this clear. One proof is that it was the first in the world to fight and defeat the American imperialists: in world history no army has ever defeated the American imperialist like this. We were the first to defeat them. This is one clear proof.

There is a lot of proof, but I will just use some to make things clear. Another proof is that after the war, this Army fulfilled its mission of defending the country well and has joined in building the country well and has been very active in increasing production for maximum self-reliance. It has set aside time from its mission of defending the country to increase production to the maximum. I want to tell you that some Zone Armies have provided rice to Angkar and to the State for export and sale overseas too. As I recall, approximately 40,000 tons of rice from throughout the country, and so much from this and that Zone. The Party did not have the army increase production: it took the defense of the country as its core, fundamental mission. Building the country and increasing production for self-reliance was secondary, and was done to temper our troops. Our Army knows how to wage war. Our Army knows how to increase production too. Our Army has never been defeated in any fight; it always wins, because it knows how to wage war and know how to find food supplies. Also, the Army has worked well in the base areas too.

Using these two proofs, we see that our Army is very high quality, and can be compared to the armies throughout the world. However, does the mission of our Army end just with this, or does it continue? With the quality of our Army having reached this level, must we stop here, or continue on? We must be proud. We must be pleased with the quality of our army as it is today. However, we must strive to keep building, strengthening, and expanding our Army, and we must increase its quality both in the mission of defending the country and in the mission of building our country inside the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism. To make our Army even higher quality, our entire Army, like our entire people, must concentrate on building the Party in terms of politics, ideology, and organization. In the past, our Army has been of good,

high quality, like I said a moment ago. This is due to good politics, good ideology, and good organization. It has the fundamental positives. It also has negatives: it is not like it does not. However, the favorables are fundamental and this is why it achieved victory during the war and has seized post-war victories. However, now we must continue to strengthen and expand its political stances, strengthen and expand its revolutionary ideological stances, and strengthen and expand the organization of the Army.

The core theme of building politics and ideology is building our socialist revolution stances those of our Party now. We concentrate on building politics and ideology well because they are the decisive factors, the fundamentals for our Party to have clean politics and ideology. By clean, I mean clean in the sense of grasping the Party line, being in unity with the Party line, absorbing the Party line in the sense of implementing the political, ideological, and organizational lines and the lines in every field of the Party inside the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism.

Comrades, whether inside the Army or not, must study and learn from socialist revolution. And in our successive meetings we will always speak of what this socialist revolution is. At this time, I wish to make it clear that we are concentrating on strengthening, expanding, and continuing socialist revolution in order to defend the country well, build the country well, and maintain well the honor of our nation, the honor of our Army, and the honor of our Party and of our revolution. We do not carry out socialist revolution for any reasons other than these. If we carry out socialist revolution well inside and outside the Army the country's defense will be guaranteed, and no enemy will be able to enter. When our Army is politically clean, ideologically clean, and organizationally clean, it is an iron wall that nothing can penetrate. This is because the defense of our country and our revolution and the defense of the fruits of the revolution will not permit it to be damaged again. This is our mission. This is the mission of our generation, the generation that fulfilled the mission of the total liberation of the country and the people. It falls to our generation to have the missions of defending the fruits of the revolution and continuing to defend the country well. Therefore, as I have said before, no one has a greater honor than our generation. Our generation liberated the country and liberated the entire people, and our generation has the missions of defending the country and defending the revolution and raising the honor of the nation high, the honor of the nation was previously trampled upon and insulted for thousands of years. We, no one else, must maintain and strengthen and expand it. Who do we assign these missions to? There is only our generation. When our generation performs well, later generations can also perform well. But if our generation does not perform well, later generations will be even less able to perform well. In plain language, it is like this. Thus, it is a very great honor and it is not an easy thing for anyone to have the opportunity to liberate their country and people and defend their country and people as our generation has. So then, do not lose any time. Do not lose this opportunity. Do not lose one day. Do not lose one month. This is one thing.

Furthermore, it has been our experience that we have liberated the country well, have carried out socialist revolution well, and have built the country well. In building the country at present, like I have said, in 1977 in terms of food rations some have a

ration of 30 kilograms per month, some have 25 kilograms, some have 20 kilograms, and some have 15 kilograms per month. The minimum is just ten kilograms. These rations are sufficient according to what we have fully set aside. This is very high.

It is true that we still have shortfalls in clothing, but our rations are very high. Sickness has been greatly reduced. This is because the livelihood of the people has risen.

So then, the essence of socialist revolution and building socialism is the goal of building the country well, defending the country well, and sorting out the livelihood of the people quickly. We need from 15 to 20 million people to meet the needs of our land. For our population to constantly increase, the livelihood of the people must rise and they must be in good health. So then, this means quickly increasing production. The money obtained from exporting products for sale overseas is for expanding agriculture, expanding industry, and serving the livelihood of the people. It is not used for anything other than that.

The enemy always makes propaganda that we are carrying out socialist revolution so that we will be left with nothing. In fact, this year's results are sufficient proof that we carry out socialist revolution so that our worker-peasant people have enough to pioneer on to abundance and plenty. We carry out socialist revolution and build socialism in order to build the country and sort out the livelihood of the people quickly.

An example: If this year we export a lot of rice, we will use the money we receive in return to buy anti-malaria medicines and buy machinery to assist the manpower of our people. Furthermore, when within three to four years we have totally eradicated malaria in Kampuchea, that will be a tremendous victory, because malaria has existed for centuries.

An example: We must sort out housing for the people, and we must concentrate on doing this within two or three years. So then, we must carry out socialist revolution. The collective will be fast and strong.

No one acts as our master; we are the masters. So then, as for defending our country and building our country and raising the livelihood of our people, whether we do it fast or not is up to us. In order to do it quickly, it is imperative to carry out socialist revolution well. If we do not carry out socialist revolution well, we will not be fast.

It is imperative to concentrate on and strengthen and expand the issue of organization and purge our Army to make it clean and pure following the Party's line. A strong Army is a clean Army. As long as it is clean, even if the numbers are few it will still be strong. Only education will make the Army clean. Our Army is a good Army. But as for absorbing the Party line in every part, it does not yet understand every part. On this or that view there are still the normal deficiencies. So then, it is imperative to educate time and time again.

In this, I wish to raise one issue that must be made clear, the issue of political views. This is not just for the Army, but for the entire Army and the entire Party. Political views must be crystal-clear and clear-sighted. Each of our comrades, especially in the Army, must have clear political views about us. By about us, I mean being clear about our Democratic Kampuchea, what our strong points are and what our weak points are. It is imperative for you to understand them clearly own your own. In tandem, with this, we must understand the enemy clearly, what their strong and weak points are. What were the weak points of enemies near and far during each period of time? The Party leadership must understand. The Party inside the Army must understand.

Ordinarily, the enemy is always disseminating the view that we are weak or are a small country or a poor country that has not strength to resist them to make us have that understanding. So then, they fall into using the mistaken phrase "An egg cannot stand up against being hit by a rock" to make us more confused in terms of political views. They would have us understand that the enemy is strong and we are weak. Along with this, some enemy agents disseminate about enemy influence saying that they are strong in this or that way in order to put down our troops and make our people fear them. This issue must be paid attention to. They did this before. They are doing it now. Later on, they will do it. And if they are able to do this, when they make a few attacks, we will not dare to fight them, and when they make many attacks, we will even less dare to fight them. This is because they will have put down our ideology. This issue has great importance. It is the view of analyzing the weak and strong points of both the enemy and ourselves. In truth, we fought and drafted the American imperialists, the ring leaders of world imperialism. We must clearly see this view of our forces and the enemy's forces. Do not let them agitate and attack our stances. They are seeking ruses aimed at attacking our stances. When we have clear views, we do not fear the enemy. We dare to attack. In the past we fought with our bare hands, as I have already said.

We must strengthen this view. See the weak and strong points of the enemy. See our weak and strong points. Now we have an Army, we have divisions, but if politics and ideology are not good, this Army will be weak and will scattered and be torn. Suppose that the Americans come again. Will we dare to fight them? We have already fought them. They used all their weapons except for nuclear. They did not dare use their nuclear weapons on us. We do not fear them. We know them already, and we will fight them even stronger than before. When we analyze the Americans like this, we will dare to fight any enemy that dares to commit aggression against us.

- Our strong pint is that our people are very brave. With the correct Party leadership, they very strong. But without correct Party leadership, the people will not support the Party. On this occasion we are talking about the Army, but in truth we are talking about Party-building.

In summary, it is imperative to keep building our Army and to raise its quality even higher. Foreign countries evaluate us very highly. Just look! Our Army has no ranks, no salaries; it sacrifices for class, for the revolution. It increases production to support itself to lighten the burdens of the people. In tandem with this, it defends the

country to the maximum. They are in awe. They want to study and learn from our Army. The quality is very high when compared to the rest of the world. However, it is imperative to keep raising the quality. Now it is an example; however, it must keep on being an example.



**This photograph: Girls in a sewing team in Phnom Penh are striving to go on a day-and-night clothing sewing offensive to quickly sew even more clothing to be transported to cooperative members throughout the country, this as a contribution to sorting out the livelihood of our people and making them even happier and better off.**