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THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAG
Issue 8 August 1977

The Presentation

Of the Party Organization Representative

Regarding

A Number of Instructions in Building,

Strengthening and Expanding Party Leadership

On the Occasion of the

West Zone Cadre Conference

25 July 1977



I wish to make a presentation regarding the instructions of the Party on a number of important matters for implementation in the second semester of 1977. These are important issues that must be implemented from now until late 1977. As I have learned from the reports of the Zone these past several days, the comrades in every Sector have already studied these Party instructions. However, on this opportunity to learn from the model district (Kampong Tralach Leu), the Zone Com. joins me in seeing that it is necessary to further disseminate and clarify these instructions so that comrades may further assess and consider their concrete meaning in your individual base areas. Why raise these matters again, clarify them again? In order to assess at year's end if we have

strongly accomplished these tasks, completely accomplished our 1977 tasks. This is the objective.

If we can grasp these instructions clearly in terms of concrete implementation, we clearly will accomplish the 1977 plans. Therefore, the instructions which we clarify at this time are to absolutely achieve three tons and six tons, to achieve attacking and cleaning out the enemy, and to absolutely build Party leadership. It is true that we are busy actively plowing, harrowing, pulling seedlings and transplanting on the paddy-field battlefield, but we must add one additional day, 25 July, to discuss with one another so that we will further absorb this in order to decisively attack our tasks. The issues which I will present, as the Comrade Organizing Chairman informed you a moment ago, are four:

- 1. The issue of Party-building and leadership-building at every echelon**
- 2. Continuing to attack, sweep clean, and get rid of all enemies within the ranks**
- 3. The issue of three tons and six tons**
- 4. The issue of sorting out the living standards of the people by way of the regime designated by the Party**

Among these four issues, one is the most important, the issue of strengthening and expanding the Party and building the leadership at every echelon. This is the fundamental issue for us, the key issue for accomplishing our other plans.

Therefore, I wish to present this first issue, and it will require the most time. As for the others, they are secondary, because the first covers them all. If we resolve the first issue well, then we can also sort out the rest well. I will not present issues 2, 3, and 4 on this occasion.

The Issue of Strengthening and Expanding the Party and Strengthening and Expanding the Leadership at Every Echelon

According to the decisions of the Party throughout the country and as I recall according to the decisions of the Party in the West Zone during the February 1977 Conference in Kampong Chhnang, we agreed, "To do whatever it takes so that each 1,000-family cooperative has 30 Party members, 50 core organization members, and 80 progressives." This is speaking in terms of averages.

Now in mid 1977, we assess: How is the Party-building situation? How is the leadership situation? The Party has made an assessment and sees that during the past six months our Party has two aspects:

1. A significant number of cadres, Party members, and core organization members were cast off, were overthrown and dissolved, and fell away from the movement. The movement herded and trampled elements that betrayed the revolution: counter-revolutionary elements, dangerous elements, no-good elements. All these elements were trampled and crushed by the mass movement during these past six months. Some held high-level cadre status; some were mid-level cadres; some were low-level cadres; some were Party members; and some were core organization members. A considerable number were cast off, speaking nation-wide. However, speaking of the Zones, a considerable number fell away during the past six months.

2. But the remaining cadres, the remaining core-organization members are cadres that are elements of good quality because they are cadres, Party members, or core organization members that have already been screened [សំរិតសំរាំង] inside the movement and have already passed through the movement well. They have been tempered inside the movement and are hard; those Party members and core organization members are of good quality. Why do we say good quality? Because they have many good aspects. But I wish to bring up two aspects:

The Party member and core organization member elements that remain are still standing upright in the open inside the current revolutionary movement, meaning they have gone through and escaped from an extremely bad and poisonous movement, a movement that the enemy subsequently poisoned. But we were not poisoned. We were able to pass through it, this poisonous situation, and still remain strong, are even stronger. The enemy attacked us in 1977 (actually, they had attacked us long before that). They did not attack with B-52s, with armored vehicles, aircraft, or artillery. They attacked in a war of espionage; they attacked by boring holes from within. It was an attack on stances, political stances, ideological stances, and organizational stances, which we said was very poisonous. But, we were not poisoned; those who were poisoned fell away. Those who were not poisoned are still standing upright out in the open like before: they continue to lead the movement and the movement is still strong. We say the movement is still strong because it leads the masses to defend the country and build the country. So it is still strong.

One part that was no-good was trampled, buried, and gotten rid of by the movement. But another part that was good still remains standing upright in the open waving the flag of combat, attacking the internally embedded enemy inside the country and the enemy outside the country, waving the flag of combat to build the country, on the offensive to decisive attack three tons and six tons. Therefore, the quality of the Party is still strong, even stronger. A number of veteran elements were harmed, and new elements arose. A number of veteran elements fell. A number of veteran elements rose up to wave the flag of combat and follow the Party line. Therefore, the movement constantly rolls forward, is constantly speeding forward; it does not stand still. Some at Zone level fell

away; some at district level fell away; some at cooperative level fell away. Has the movement stopped or gone into reverse? It has not gone into reverse. It has not stopped. It had kept on going forward. It has accelerated. Let me tell you about the situation of the Party nationwide and the situation of the Party in the West Zone. When we all examine this together, this is how it is:

In order to have faith in ourselves, to be crystal clear in the ideology of each of us, just take a look at each district, each Sector.

Kampong Chhnang Sector: How many have been lost from all the districts in the Kampong Chhnang Sector? A number at Sector and district level have been lost. At cooperative level how many have been lost? A number have been lost. This is what is called a loss of our flesh and blood, but it was not good flesh and blood. It was rotten flesh. The loss was rotten flesh. It was lost, and when it was lost, if we do not make a correct analysis, we might assume that it was a loss of good flesh, that good flesh fell away and good flesh was damaged. But all that was lost ulcerated flesh. All those sores and ulcers, they are gone.

So only good flesh remains. Our flesh, our bodies, our faces, they are still good flesh, cured of the ulcerations and boils of all kinds. Therefore, the health of Sector 31 is better than before. Is that true, or untrue? If we make an incorrect analysis, we might see that we are out of cadres. We might say that before there were many of us and we almost could not do the work, so now that some are gone it is even harder to do the work. This analysis is wrong. This is not objective analysis and is not based upon reality, upon the true nature of the dispute. In truth, this shedding was a shedding of bad flesh. Therefore, the health of Sector 31 is better than before. How is it better than before? We see the numbers have gone down, the Sector has gone down some, the district has gone down some compared to previously, but the line of the Party was the insertion of one-for-one, two-for-two, three-for-three, meaning joining the Sector, joining the districts, joining the cooperatives, so they are much better than before. At locations in good health, the medicine injected goes in well. There are no germs fighting us. Previously there were germs fighting us. Do you see? Germs fighting. Fertilizer number one was not fertilizer number one: it became fertilizer of some other number pretending to be fertilizer number one. They used some spots to be fertilizer number one. This was what is called an opposition force, germs fighting. Previously there were really a lot of them, but they were opposition forces, many germs fighting. Now the germs have been removed, and fertilizer number one is really fertilizer number one, and fertilizer number two is certain to be fertilizer number two. On this, the movement is faster than before. All the battlefields are like that. The dam battlefields, the fertilizer battlefield, the sowing battlefield, the seed battlefield, the transplanting battlefields, the plowing-harrowing battlefield, they are like that. Caring for livestock, maintaining plows, harrows, and plowshares is better than before. Why? There are no germs fighting us, or else we have swept clean many of the germs fighting us.

So in Sector 31^{*}, speaking separately about Sector 31 as an example, the numbers seem low, but the quality has gone up from what it was before because there are no forces of germs, there are no germs fighting us. The opposition forces have been weakened. On this, on what is called the true nature of the Party, it is getting stronger because the Party is clean. When the Party is clean, the politics are clean, the ideology is clean, and the organization is clean. And when the politics are good, the ideology is good, the organization is good, and the movement is good. Let me inform you about the situation by using Sector 31 as an example. Each district in Sector 31 is like that.

Sector 32 is like that too. Imagine the old Sector 15 (already brought into Sector 32). The old Sector 15 was originally very rotten. Its flesh was mostly rotten. Now we have sorted out and removed that rotten flesh. Being able to resolve this has led to our health being clean, our health being good. Our movement is stronger than before despite the fact that the numbers have gone down. But the movement is strong. This is in terms of health, an aspect that we have analyzed.


Sector 37 is the same. Comparatively, Sector 37 is still more complicated than Sectors 31 and 32 because there are many new elements and it has a bad history. Koh Kong has had betrayal since long, long ago. In 1974 we sorted that out and got good control. As for Kampong Seila, we only recently sorted that out last year. The health of Koh Kong in the past was hugely complicated. It was not just complicated for the Zone, not just complicated for the Sector: the complications reached the Party Center too. How was it complicated? There were many complications:

For example, Koh Kong led the people from Kampong Seila to flee and to oppose Kampong Seila. But Koh Kong and Kampong Seila got along with one another. Not good people getting along together, but bad people getting along together. The despicable Chong and the despicable Chhan got along well. This is just talking about three people. They made things constantly complicated, made the Center constantly complicated. But it was not just that. This was one thing.

Another issue was that they wanted to take Koh Kong (meaning the old Koh Kong and Kampong Seila combined) in order to collaborate with the contemptible Nol and the Thai reactionaries, and take all of Koh Kong to join with the Thai reactionaries. Whenever American imperialists and the despicable Nol were defeated in Phnom Penh by the revolution, the Americans would deploy at Kampong Saom and have the contemptible Nol stay there, and they would use Koh Kong as a fall-back. So, they fought to seize the entire Koh Kong territory from Kampuchea too. This is not a minor issue. Re-examining this, it is seen that the group that collaborated with the traitors in Koh Kong committed a very serious offense. But we were able to sort out the germ elements at Koh Kong and at Kampong Seila. Now the whole of Sector 37, the combination of the 11 (Old), 37(Old) that is called 37 (New), is clean, very much cleaner than before.

* Sector 31: Kampong Chhnang. Sector 32 Kampong Seila Khang Cheung and Udong-Ponhea Leu and Ang Snuol. Sector 37: Koh Kong and Kampong Seila. Sector 15 (Old): Udong, Ponhea Leu, Ang Snuol. Sector 11 (Old): Koh Kong

(The pre-conditions in that era, the 71-72-73-74 era, were that we were attacking Highway 3 and Highway 4, attacking pushing Phnom Penh, and they were attacking from the rear. In particular, they contested in Koh Kong, doing whatever possible to prevent us from attacking Highway 4 and attacking Phnom Penh. If we had not had forces to counter them in the rear, they would have cut off Koh Kong and gone with the Thai reactionaries. It was very dangerous. But in 1974 we sorted out this issue completely and permanently: nos problem remained because we had already eradicated all the enemies. The major enemies were all gone. Koh Kong, we were able to sort that out, and we were also able to sort out Kampong Seila.)



At the end of this past dry season our peasants in Kampong Tralach Leu district were on a lively offensive transporting fertilizer and carrying fertilizer to place on the paddy fields for this year's offensive to increase rice production beyond the 1976 level.

Now, while there are in fact some complications, the complications are secondary in a period when we have to further strengthen and expand ourselves more. This is talking about the current 37. Now we are still building more, screening (សំរិតសំរាំង) more vis-à-vis the elements that are still bad, especially in the base areas. But we have sorted out a lot of those at the upper levels. Therefore, this is how we see the health of Sector 37.

We analyze to discover the contradictions, to see the good points and the difficult points. Now, having been able to sort of these contradictions like this is a major victory in within the Zone.

However, on into the future there is still a lot of work. Defending the country continues. Building the country continues. Three tons and six tons will not end at just 1977. It is imperative to continue the attack. It is imperative to have the forces to attack, to make the final attack. Now we have this level of forces. This has been spoken about in our meetings. As for the base areas, there are the Party members, the core-organization members, the troops, and the people. Can we make the final attack on three and six tons? We must strive to make the final attack. With these numbers of forces, we must make the final attack. However, in order to gain further mastery and to have even more forces to make the final attacks even more decisive, it is imperative to add forces, to expand forces.

The Issue that Must be Raised for Clarification is Further Strengthening and Expanding Forces, What is Called Strengthening and Expanding Party Leadership and Strengthening and Expanding Leadership at Every Echelon

It is imperative to do more, because there is much work. We must work hard. We must strike hard. Suppose that in the Zone Committee there are several people running, criss-crossing back and forth, and if there were more, the work would be stronger. It is the same in the Sectors. If the numbers go up, the forces would be stronger. It is the same in the districts. It is the same in the cooperatives. When the numbers are high, the quality is good. This is the issue that we all must discuss today and during the continuing days in order to increase our leadership.

1. Party members: Now we reach the point. How do we expand the new membership? The Party has decided that on this matter, we must all know. The masses must know as well, because to use the masses inside the Party, the masses inside the Army, the masses outside the Party, to build the Party, it is imperative to recruit the masses and the masses must understand which Party members are good and which are not good. It is imperative to induct good people and to not induct people who are not good.

First, the Party has determined to expand new membership only in good locations that have no traitor elements, meaning those locations in the Sectors and districts, in the base areas, in the ministries and offices large and small, and in the various units. Any

good locations that have no traitors, that have good elements, good cadre and Party member elements, must be expanded. This is the first thing.

Second, the Party has determined that any locations with traitor elements must not be expanded.

We make this distinction. Everyone must know, must understand and be in unity, and no deception can be permitted. If we do this quietly, if we go do this covertly at this and that location, the masses will not know and they will ask why this is not being done at other locations. Therefore, everyone must know the policy of the Party.

Why is it that we do not expand at locations that have enemy elements and are enemy-controlled locations? We do not expand at enemy-controlled locations because they are the sources of the enemy's activities to expand core organization. The enemies embedded within us, whether they are Sector members or they control districts, they expand core organization and expand membership in their own style. Not just a few during the past several years. If we recruit as those locations, there is no guarantee, because the sources of core organization would emerge from traitor sources. Sometimes the core organization does not become traitorous following the enemy, but the source is not good. In fact, clearly the majority have been built by the enemy; clearly the enemy has organized any elements they were pleased with. Who were the elements that they are pleased with? The elements that were with them, that served their policies. If we use the core organization to expand into Party membership, the core organization that are under enemy control and that the enemy has built, to expand Party membership, that would mean that we would be recruiting in filthy, ulcerated locations to build the Party leadership. Would that be good not good? We all assess that it would not be good, because they are ulcerated already and have would be recruiting from filthy seedbeds. I am not saying 100 percent are bad; it may just be one or two persons, but, speaking generally, fundamentally they are bad because the enemy built them. It that true or not true? We all make the assessment to be crystal-clear about the Party line. This is because it is not like a Party instructional circular is done without understanding. The Party has raised this principle based on the concrete situation and a clear analysis in order to take measures appropriate to the situation. Is that true or not true? So then, are the measures appropriate or not? In order to understand if that is true or not true, we assess our base areas. Imagine Sector 37, the history of which I spoke about earlier. The contemptible Chong's group controlled it all along, and later the contemptible Nheuk's group controlled it all along. They were built into Party members, into cadres, into the Army. This is a location about which we must be vigilant. We must pay attention to and be vigilant toward the sources built by those groups. This is what I wish to tell you. And other locations are like that as well. Sector 15 inside the present 32 framework is like that as well. Kampong Leng in 31 is like that as well.

Therefore, it is imperative to be vigilant towards all these locations. However, within the Zone and within the Sectors, are there any good parts, are there any good units? There are: it is not like there aren't any. ... According to the Zone's analysis,

according to the numbers, 50 percent are no-good and bad, and 50 percent are still good. These are not small numbers: 50 percent quality.

In Sector 37, some locations are still good. This unit is not good; that unit might be good. Speaking in general, they are not good; but speaking separately, there are good elements that must be recruited.

Sector 32 is the same. Sector 31 is the same.

Let me inform you of the reason why at some locations we are not organizing and expanding Party membership and at other locations we are expanding Party membership.

Any enemy-controlled location must not be expanded, and we must expand any location that is not a source of the enemy. Expansion is necessary. This is because an examination of the situation throughout the country shows that it keeps getting choked-off and Party membership cannot expand. It seems as if we just see the traitors; we see the no-good elements. In truth, they are not all traitors; they are not all bad. We take the example of the West Zone, where 50 percent are not good. It seems like all of them, but in truth only 50 percent are not good. Among that 50 percent, they are not all traitors: only 15 to 20 percent are traitors. Sprinkled in among them are the know-nothings perhaps just following along, and we remove them not as a security measure: we remove them and take them to do other work. This is what I wish to tell you about the situation of Party membership having to be expanded -- If we do not expand, we lose. But, if we were to expand without a policy, expand everywhere, that would be wrong, strategically wrong.

Imagine that circulars like before had said that each Zone had to expand to a certain number, each Sector to a certain number, each district to a certain number, and every level and echelon was like that. That would be wrong in light of the present situation, because they are different: each base area, each district, is in a different state. Some Sectors have a large number of good elements; some Sectors have few good elements. Therefore, it is imperative to recruit accordingly. In summary, it is my opinion, as an example, that from now until the end of the year, if we expand following the Party policy about which I have just informed you, if we can expand Party membership by just 300 and can promise they are not enemies, this would be a major victory.

Do we have the potential to expand? In all three base areas, 31, 32, 37, and in the ministries and offices and in the Army, 300, that would be an assumed victory. In the past it kept getting choked-off. We had the biographies brought in. How were the biographies? Who gave the biographies? Everyone gave the biographies: good people gave them; bad people gave them. Therefore, it was confused, and so the biographies were not much of a guarantee, and we did not dare expand. In the past, no-good people were expanded, had the right to expand. Now it is not like that: there must be a distinction made. The Zone Com has taken charge of getting a grasp on this problem in accordance with Party policy.

Getting 300 would be strong, a 300 person increase by the end of the year. But, if we go all out to research thoroughly, not just 300 but more: if the Army gets a number, each bases areas gets a number, each sector gets a number too, getting 500 would not be difficult. But we are not talking about 500; we are talking about 300. This would be a major victory in comparison with before. Before we got none, or got four to ten. Four to ten is very different from 300. 300 that have been screened [សំរិតសំរាំង], that are good, that would be a big help.

2. Core organization: Core organization must also expand in accordance with Party policy. In order to expand core organization, it is imperative to recruit from people who are progressives. Vis-à-vis these matters, the Party has determined that it is imperative to recruit core organization at any location that has good elements, good cadre elements and good Party member elements. Any location that has embedded enemy elements or bad elements must not be expanded, because the enemies embedded within also recruit progressives. They recruit in various places the persons that they trust in order to get control of this and that in preparation for core organization induction and in preparation for Party member induction.

Before there was an instruction circular regarding this policy of expansion, enemy elements proposed a number of their lists in order to expand core organization. This matter must be temporarily put on hold. We must re-organize. If we organize like this, I understand that the situation in the Zone will be well-organized. We have gotten a number, because we have recruited from only good sources. Because the sources were good, we recruited. Therefore, 1,000 might be recruited from now until year-end, and that would be a major success for the Zone. But there could perhaps be more than 1,000, because core organization must be more than Party membership. In the Army, in the base areas too, and in the ministries-offices, there is more potential for expansion than there is in the Party. However, if we get 300 Party members and core organization membership is just 1,000, this would be an insufficient force to make strong attacks on every problem. Insufficient, when we calculate the numbers. If 1,300 persons were distributed throughout the entire Zone, how many would there be? Just 3-4 per location. Therefore, that would not yet be strong in accordance with Party objectives. We want to be strong in accordance with Party objectives. Therefore, the numbers must be somewhat high. If we want high numbers, how must we resolve this? On this, the Party instructs that **it is imperative to sort out by strongly building the progressives.**

3. Progressives: Progressives have not yet joined the core organization. However, we must recruit our progressives. This matter is of strategic importance in the near term, during the next one to two years, and on into the future. During the past year or two, Party membership expanded slightly, and core organization expanded slightly. However, the progressive masses must be greatly expanded, to the maximum. Use these forces strategically in the near term and strategically in the long term.

Where must these progressives be recruited from and what are the qualifications in principle? Let me tell you the following:

The progressive masses must be recruited from the fundamental class, primarily the poor peasants and the lower-middle level peasants and after them, the middle peasants. The class recruitment goal is like that.


Why primarily recruit progressives within the poor peasant and lower-middle peasant class? In a word, for political reasons, meaning the fundamental class is the poor and the lower-middle peasants:

1. They are the most numerous among the people.

2. From the beginning, the embedded enemy boring holes within us has not yet concentrated on them and made them into their cadres. They recruited just those who swung back-and-forth, those who had similar political stances; those were the ones they were able to recruit. Therefore, most of those they recruited were from middle level on up. In general it was like that. And not just that, they recruited more than a few of the post-liberation group. In the West Zone it could really be said there were few, speaking in general, but in some locations there were not just a few. In District 18 there were not just a few. From what I know, some cooperatives have [former regime] soldiers, not just soldiers as members, but soldiers in the leadership, post-liberation elements; more than a few of them are responsible for leadership with the cooperatives. Kampong Leng also has more than a few. Ponhea Leu is not much different. Boribau Khang Kraom and Rolea Baier Khang Kraom must be examined as well. In Sector 37, they are even more plentiful. I hear that Kampong Saom businessmen are working platoon-company chairmen in Sector 37. And if a businessman is working as a platoon-company chairman, the cooperative need not follow the direction of socialism: it will go in the direction of private ownership and it attacks the collective. It will clearly attack socialism. Enemy elements recruit like that. In Sector 37, old leadership elements recruit like that and those locations have many post-liberation elements too, and they recruit them that way too. In District 18, district elements are unsettled too, and they recruit like that. In District 16, the district is unsettled, and the cooperatives recruit in that direction. So then this is why there are constant troubles between the North Zone and the West along the borders, along the Tonle Sap River, in Batheay - Taing Kouk - Baray districts adjacent to District 18[†] and District 16[‡].

[†] 18: Kampong Tralach Kraom

[‡] 16: Kampong Leng



Our peasants love concentrating on caring for livestock, which they consider to be their closest comrades in arms. At night, aside from putting down straw and grass fodder, the brothers and sisters light fires to protect them against mosquito and insect bites.

Therefore, there are constant troubles. Upper echelons agree and compromise without problems. Then when they go back home, there are constant troubles. Why? Because the cooperatives over there are bad, the cooperatives over here are bad too. It is not that the cooperative unit is bad, meaning it comes from some of the elements leading the cooperatives being bad. That's why I say that the enemy organizes only those kinds of elements. They do not go deep within the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants. Therefore, the poor and lower-middle peasants, speaking in general, are still clean. Speaking individually, some are not very clean; but generally speaking, they are still clean, politically clean. Politically clean, not indebted to or entangled with the enemy. This source is a good source that we can use. If we gather them up, will they be able to serve the movement? In the near term, can they serve or not? In the long term can they serve or not? In the near term, if they are clean, they can serve. If they are politically clean, they are good. And if they are politically clean, can the poor peasants tend cattle or not? They can tend cattle better than anyone else can. The Party lines says that the cattle and the buffaloes are the comrades in arms of the poor and lower-middle peasants. They

can fulfill that mission. However, if a businessman tends cattle, he is not their comrade in arms. They are mutual enemies. The businessman comes from the market, and because of this there is an antagonist contradiction between them. When there is an antagonist contradiction, he constantly steals and slaughters the cattle, slaughtering once every two or three days without anyone knowing, in herds; whether or not the cattle graze, the heck with it; in the rainy season they eat the rice transplant seedlings. This is an antagonistic contradiction.

A number of post-liberation elements throughout the country do not consider the cattle to be their comrades in arms. So then, they do not implement the Party line because they are in conflict. So, are the poor peasants in conflict with the cattle? No, they are truly comrades in arms. Being true comrades in arms, they are able to implement the Party line, and the cattle grow fat, the cattle are good. They can serve the movement. They can plow and harrow. Can they make fertilizer? They can. Can they make plows? Can they transplant? They can. Can they sow? They can. Can they build dams and reservoirs? They can. They can do anything, everything at all. Therefore, being politically clean, they can labor fully in every sector. In constructing socialism they are able to fulfill every mission at any spearhead.

And they are able to accept technical missions, the work of three and six tons: they can do it in every Sector. In the near term, they are able to accept the mission.

The weak point is, when we at Zone, Sector, or District have them report in writing, report once weekly, and after one week they do not report, after two weeks they do not report, after one month they do not report, we say that they have not done anything at all and we drive them away and get rid of them. That is a serious mistake. This is being bureaucratic. This is being mandarins. We must go to meet them, or invite them to come meet us, and have them report verbally, report verbally on what has gone right and what has gone wrong. We question them. We sort it out verbally. They are able to report everything: How is the water? How are the cattle? Are they fat? Do they lack fodder? How do we go find fodder? How do we go find straw? Can they sort it out or not? They can sort it out. But, if we sort it out by having them report in writing when they cannot write and then we blame them, then they ask to quit due to a minor conflict: due to our demanding that they work by writing. By using a bureaucratic activity line, we dim the strategic forces. That is a very big mistake, a strategic mistake.

I wish to raise this problem in order to prevent this in advance, so that this will not become a conflict. In truth there is no conflict. If we create a conflict, that is incorrect, judging them incorrectly, denying the strategic forces. **In concrete fact, they can do everything. They can all be cores. In the near term they can do it. In the future they can do it. Strategically, they can do it.**

On this matter, I inform you that **it is imperative to re-recruit from the base areas**. Any source that is good must be built, meaning the new sources. **The new sources are the ordinary masses**, the masses that have not yet been inducted into anything at all, ordinary cooperative members not responsible for anything. But what class? The poor

and lower-middle peasant class that can be referred to in a new way as raw fabric, white cotton cloth not yet soiled. Use these forces and build them. These forces are able to serve the work of three tons and six tons, and next year will be able to do four tons and eight tons. These forces are politically clean and the labor they perform is the strongest of them all.

Let me make it clear that the Party has examined and drew the clear experience that we took power nationwide by making national democratic revolution and passing through many periods of the struggle movement and by making more than a few sacrifices. The sacrifices of life during war were many: the troops, the people, more than a few of them sacrificed their lives. That we were able to seize victory throughout the country, to control state authority throughout the country, was a major victory, but the enemy has constantly sought to seize state power from us. They made preparations to seize state power from us even before we won. So then, this is why they have been embedded within our ranks for a long time.

Take this Zone for example. In this Zone there are embedded enemies. In the Sectors there are embedded enemy elements. In the districts, there are also embedded enemy elements, and so on. After we seized victory throughout the country, they came to bore holes to seize state power back from us, Zone state power, Sector state power, District state power. Especially, they seized state power in the cooperatives because we had few cores in those locations. Examine the cooperative coms. What is their class composition? Look at the composition at the spearheads controlling the platoons, the fertilizer spearheads, the seed spearheads, the sowing, seeding, and transplanting spearheads, the water spearheads. Who controls them inside the cooperatives? The poor peasants, the lower-middle peasants, the middle peasants, or various other classes? In order to determine the true nature of the state power, I see that a large number of cooperatives in Sector 37 do not yet belong to the revolution. Therefore, some of our comrades have had to go to Sector 37 on a good new mission, to fight to take back state power for the worker-peasants in the cooperatives, to attack and take state power in the cooperatives. But it is not just in 37. In 31, 32, in which cooperatives do the worker-peasants already hold state power? In which of the cooperatives do the worker-peasants not yet hold state power? We must reexamine this in order to clarify who holds power, looking at this by class.

In even the upper parts of the cooperatives, sometimes the enemy and classes other than the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants are embedded, for instance in upper Sector 32, for one. But down below must be re-examined, in particular Ponhea Leu and Kampong Luong Khang Kraom, Kampong Tralach Khang Kraom, Kampong Leng, Boribau, Rolea Ba-ier Kraom Khang Kraom. Who holds power in each cooperative? Generally speaking in the entire West Zone, in a large part we already control the cooperatives and state power, meaning it is already in the hands of the Party's worker-peasants. However, a fairly large part is not yet in the hands of the Party's worker-peasants: it is still in the hands of various other classes. And if it is in the hands of other classes, have those classes come over to the side of the revolution? No. They oppose the revolution. It is only a matter of whether they oppose the revolution a little or a lot,

whether they antagonistically oppose or do not yet antagonistically oppose. After we make this assessment we have to prepare forces to lead the cooperatives. Prepare what forces? **Prepare the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants to control the cooperatives, to attack and smash the state power of other classes who stole control from of our cooperatives and give it back to the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants down below.** Now we have been able to screen [សំរិតសំរាំង] and fight in the Zone, able to fight in the Sectors, able to fight in the Districts; but we have not yet been able to fight in the cooperatives. It is imperative to prepare forces to attack, attack and smash the enemy and the no-good elements embedded inside and controlling the cooperatives. Use which forces to attack? This problem is not just in the West Zone; every Zone throughout the country is like this. Therefore, it cannot be ignored. It is imperative to see that the cooperatives are still controlled by the enemy and other classes. So then, this is why paddy still disappears, cattle still disappear, seed keeps on disappearing, the seedlings and plants are always bad. Why is this? This comes from the power-holding classes in the cooperatives not being the Party's worker-peasant class. The cooperative coms are not the worker-peasant class of the Party; the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants are not in control. Many spearheads, for instance the water spearheads, the cattle spearheads, the hospital spearheads, the study spearheads, and so on, are like this. They control the medicine; they destroy the medicine. In the cooperatives at the front, vis-à-vis medicine, they do not just destroy the medicine, they even use the medicine to destroy our patients too. This destruction is not merely destruction to let them be sick: they even destroy by giving injections to kill too, meaning they consider the revolution as their antagonist in conflict. As for us, we have not yet paid attention, not yet paid attention to they having an antagonistic conflict with us, and we have left them to work in the hospitals as usual because of their status, because they are easy-going with us. But their true nature is that they are in an antagonistic conflict with us. They dare to kill cooperative members. They dare to kill our people who are only mildly sick. They give injections to kill. Why is this? Anything that is revolutionary, they oppose it all. The hospital spearheads destroy hospitals. The cattle spearheads destroy cattle. The seedling spearheads destroy seedlings. The paddy-rice spearheads destroy paddy-rice. The kitchens destroy the food and water. So then, this is why they steal paddy, steal rice, steal salt, steal fermented fish paste and fish sauce. When they have spoons, they constantly disappear. Not only that, they poison too: they cook to poison the members of the cooperatives. They poison our cores in the cooperatives. This is a tense, life-and-death class struggle, a profound struggle. This shows the true nature of the antagonistic conflict between us and the enemy inside the framework of our state power, inside the framework of our cooperatives. Now, when we see this, must we attack or must we let them continue? The Party attacks and gathers forces to attack absolutely. The opening scene from this second semester onward is that it is imperative to attack inside the cooperatives. This attack is not to arrest everyone and bring them in for punishment. **It is to use the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants to control the cooperatives, to control the cooperative committees, to control the water spearheads, to control the fertilizer spearheads, to control the cattle spearheads, to control the ovens, the salt, the fermented fish paste, and the paddy-rice storehouse spearheads, to control the cooperative hospitals, to control the children in the cooperatives studying in the cooperatives, to control every spearhead.** That's all. As

for the other elements, let's remove them for a while, but if the fundamental class is good, they must be kept. The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, we will keep. As for the middle peasants in charge of secondary spearheads, for instance in charge of fertilizer spearheads, in charge of plow, harrow, and cart spearheads, the good persons can be kept because these spearheads are not as important as the others. That's all I wish to tell you. This is a strenuous struggle. This matter must be crystal clear, the attack strategy that the Party has instructed. Are we crystal clear, or not crystal clear? Only when crystal clear can we go on the attack. First, be crystal clear that it is imperative to believe that the poor and lower-middle peasants can fulfill the mission. If we do not believe this we will not struggle to have the poor and lower-middle peasants take charge of the cooperatives because ordinarily the poor and lower-middle peasants initially were quiet. I will inform you off the experience from locations in Siemreap - Uddor Mean Chey: Many of those Sector Committees were rotten with embedded enemy elements. How did we have to sort that out? Where did we get the cadres? The Party provided only 20-30 cadres. There were 500,000 people that had to be governed. We sorted it out by whipping up the poor and the lower-middle peasants. We used the forces of the masses, the fundamental class, to attack the enemy; we whipped them up to political awareness and had them take charge of state power in the cooperatives. We were able to sort that out by using those forces. But the weak point of the poor peasants and the power-middle peasants was that initially when we requested them to work as the cooperative committees, they said that they had never done that. They said that for their entire lives they had never done anything like that. If told to plow, they plowed; if told to transplant, they transplanted. Now tell them to manage 1000-family cooperatives, 500-family cooperatives, how could they manage? How could they figure this out? Seedlings, rice, political education, they said they did not do that. This was their weak point. They did not dare to do it.

Why did they not dare do it? Because from the beginning, they had been oppressed. They had been oppressed and could not get up. When the revolution came, traitors embedded themselves and took control of some the leadership inside the revolution and oppressed them again. Therefore, the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants were always frightened of them, hesitant about them, and did not dare lead the cooperatives. After they were educated, they did it, and after doing it a little bit, they asked to stop. Not able to do it, they said that said it was complicated, the food, the water, the enemy, and so on. They said they had to sort things out, had to figure things out, everything. Trained more, it was not long: they were in the fray just one month inside the movements in which they were working, and now they are able to take charge of the cooperatives, almost every cooperative. When they took charge of every cooperative, the enemy looked at them and ran away because the people, meaning the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, were still there. In the villages, they were still there. In the paddies, there they were still there. At the reservoirs, there they were still there. At the canals, there they were still there. At the plowing and harrowing sites, there they were still there. Wherever they had been, they still were there. The enemy ran from one location to another to meet with the people at other locations. The nets of poor and lower-middle peasants were still on the attack everywhere. The nets of the poor peasants and the

lower-middle peasants, when they moved, these forces (embedded for a long time) were strong, terribly strong, and many in number, in good quality.



**This plot: A Mobile Youth Unit of the Kampong Chhnang Sector
On the offensive clearing grass in a potato farm
South of Phnom Sântouch**

They can do anything. We must sort out the outlook to be crystal clear. This is the first thing that has to be clear. The second thing that must be crystal clear is for instance like the Comrade Zone Secretary expressed his opinion on a moment ago. It is imperative to dare to decide among us. Sometimes the current members of the cooperative leadership are our friends or blood relatives. If their class is good, that is alright; they can continue their activities further. But if their class is no-good, must we protect them or not protect them? Must we stand upon the state power of the Party's worker-peasants or have someone else hold power instead, even though they are our blood relatives? This problem

must be raised. It is imperative to fight on principle, because that is what is actually seen. Ordinarily, there are always and without fail various Sector cadres, district cadres, office cadres, or District units, or Sector units who are our blood relatives and our relations who are cores inside the cooperatives. When this person or that person is to be removed, we are not in agreement and we are in internal conflict. It might asked why is this or that cadre is being removed. This has clearly happened, when we were not yet in agreement on the strategic line, the strategic policy of the Party. Therefore it is imperative to be crystal clear. Even our blood relatives, our siblings, or our parents, if their class is high, if their elements are badly entangled, when they go take charge of cooperatives, in what direction will the cooperatives go? They will not go in the direction of strengthening and expanding the collective. They will go in the direction of strengthening and expanding private property. It is imperative to be crystal clear on this. We have to be crystal clear before we can be in agreement and persistently go sort out the cooperatives, sort out the poor peasant and lower-middle peasant class and have them join the cooperatives, take charge of the cooperatives, take charge of leadership duties, and govern the cooperatives and every spearhead of the cooperatives.

On this matter, let me tell you this, so that we can be crystal clear, crystal clear here in this meeting, crystal clear throughout the Zone. The masses are not a problem. It is imperative to cleanse views inside out Party and inside our cadres. It is imperative to be really fresh, be really solid, to be able to become a mighty force. This is a profound class struggle. If we are not mighty, we will not be able to sort out the cooperatives, meaning we will be hesitant, compromising, and not absolute. If we are not absolute, we will be unable to seize state power in the cooperatives. The other classes will continue to hold power in the cooperatives.

Today, we raise this fundamental matter in order to clarify it, to make it crystal clear. In coming days, we will discuss more within our organization. Each level of our organization will clarify this matter further in order to make it constantly hot. By hot, I want to say constantly and combatively active in order to fight the enemy, the various oppressor classes that have seized power in the cooperatives.

Continuing on, I wish to raise another matter in order to cleanse outlooks further, that is, **vis-à-vis the matter of whether the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants can or cannot take charge of the cooperatives.** We say they absolutely can. This is because their politics are the cleanest. They are the strongest of them all in doing the labor to increase production. They know how to do everything. They take up arms and attack strongly. In defending the country, they are the bravest.

The state powers that the Party has designated, that the leaders of world revolution have designated, in particular Lenin, are of only two kinds: **First, food. Second, guns.** Therefore state power is not composing-writing, offices, mandarins ... like the imperialists and the oppressor classes have deceived us. Not knowing how to report anything, not even knowing how to write, at least have food, at least have rice. Food is the rice paddies and farms, farming rice to the front, planting crops to the rear, potatoes, bananas, sugar cane, whatever, everything, what is called increasing production. This

production, are the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants able to increase production? These people, precisely the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, are the number one force that is the most productive.

Therefore, they are the most skilled to hold state power according to the first true nature of state power. It is imperative to sort out this view in the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants and sort it out in our cadres that do not believe in us, do not believe in the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants. This comes from our previous understanding that state power was writing, state power was reporting, state power was sitting in an office. With that understanding, we would fear state power: we would not dare hold state power. But with an understanding that state power is a plow, plowing, planting, growing, meaning paddy, meaning potatoes, meaning bananas and sugar cane, papayas, breadfruit or whatever, can the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants do it or not? They are the most skilled of all. In Kampuchea they are the most skilled of all. In the cooperatives, they are the most skilled of all.

Thus, the true nature of state power is food. Without the peasants, there is no food. Said in a word, without the peasants, there is no state power. And if we do not govern well inside our cooperatives and let other classes hold power in those cooperatives, there will never be any food. None in 75. None in 76. None in 77. None in 78. None in 80. Don't go making any three ton and six ton plans, four tons and eight tons, five tons and ten tons. Plans are only paper. If we do not prepare the power-holding classes in the cooperatives, if we do not prepare the labor force doing production work in the cooperatives, if we do not prepare this, there will be no way to get three tons or six tons, because an unclean class would hold power. They would steal and destroy the food. The power-holding class opposes food. They propose production. The no-good classes holding power in the cooperatives, what is their true nature? They are counter-revolutionary; they oppose the worker-peasants; they oppose three tons and six tons; they oppose the living standards of the people; they gather their henchmen to attack the revolution; they bow their heads to beg from foreign countries; they act as the slaves of foreign countries; they sell-out the people; they sell-out the country. They try to provoke our people to seek private ownership again. They say that private ownership can sort solve things. Do we see this? They attack the collective, attack the socialist regime, attack the revolutionary regime, so that the capitalists will come back via that; imperialism will come back; revisionism will come back, the territory-swallowing enemy will come back; the country will be a slave again. We see this very clearly. Therefore, this is why we must quickly get to a resolution of the cooperative problem, and not a resolution just by the Party, but a resolution by the ordinary masses, the poor and lower-middle peasants. They can do it now. They will be able to do it later as well. I raise the example that in a district, the matter of three tons and six tons, if we can set up the cooperatives to follow the direction of the Party, meaning that the cooperative committee is the good fundamental class, each spearhead in the cooperative is the good fundamental class, my understanding is that there is full potential for three tons and six tons. Of 100, the potential is from 80 to 120 percent. This is strong. But, if not set up like this, if we leave it as it is now with the no-good class elements that hold state power in the cooperatives, my understanding is that the probability is starvation. They attack us more. Water will be destroyed. When

there are reservoirs, they will be destroyed too. When there is water, it will allowed to flow away and be wasted. When there is water, there will be no transplanting. When there is paddy, the paddy will be destroyed. When the paddy is in the storehouses, the paddy will be hidden. Do you see? Each Sector is like that. Each district is like that. Any district which sets up its cooperatives well is fast, is quick on the attack to increase production.

I understand that some locations have water and some locations are short of water, but this is not the fundamental factor, is not an irresolvable contradiction. This is because at some locations I see that there is enough water (water from our dams) flowing 24 hours to irrigate 150 hectares. For example, the waters of the Pursat Tributary: We have dammed it at three levels, and the water flows along each of our canals. How much has to flow into the rice paddies in a minute? How much in an hour? How much during 24 hours? Hundreds of thousands of cubic meters. Along one canal connected to Pursat, how much water flows into the rice paddies? There is enough for 150 hectares. (The numbers from 20 July 1977.) But the districts and cooperatives say they can attack only 15-20 hectares per day. Therefore, where does that 130 hectares worth of water go? The loss is not insubstantial. The loss is great: 130 hectares worth is lost in 24 hours. That water is wasted. But now we have designated a 50 hectare cut-back from 150 hectares. Attack and do whatever it takes to get 100 hectares. But the 100 hectares is not obtained: only 15-20 hectares per day. Why is this? It comes from some district elements not yet being clean, from elements in the cooperatives having political problems, opposing the revolution, opposing the building of the country, opposing the sorting out of the living standards of the people. It is not a matter of there being no water. We can sort out the water problem. People can be sorted out. But on the matter of how to allocate the people, they have to be good people. What is a good person? We base that upon class, following the Party line. Good people can increase production. Just tell them to let the water flow into this or that rice paddy now, to not let any water be wasted, and the water flows. They can do it. A moment ago I said that in 1977 any district which is able to sort things out like that, any cooperative that is able to sort things out like that, will certainly fully accomplish the plans and even exceed the plans.

Suppose that in 1978 is imperative to attack and achieve four and eight tons (I do not yet have an opinion on this, because the Central Committee decides this.), but how is it that the annual figure must go up and not remain the same? Each year it keeps going up a little. For example, last year was four tons per harvest, eight tons for a double harvest. Districts that set their cooperatives up well attacked and achieve that with no problem. Thus, this was because the political preconditions were already well set up. The political preconditions in the districts were already good. The political preconditions in the cooperatives were already good. The committees were good. The spearheads were good. The people were in order and were strong at every spearhead, both the front and rear battlefields, and stuck to the plans. And if the cooperatives are set up like that, on into 1979, they will be even stronger.

But if we are not set up, this year will be uneven, next year will be uneven and in July and August the problem of food supply <<getting by>> will arise again. The problem of gruel, of other things, will arise again. Gruel will be a problem all along.

Another issue which speaks to state power and guns: With guns, state power can be seized. We already clearly know this; no one needs to tell us this. Because we had guns, we were able to seize state power. **But, because of having guns we are able to defend state power.** What are those guns?

First, the army.

Second, the people armed with weapons, armed with modern weapons and ancient weapons or whatever, but the people. Which people? The poor peasant people and the lower-middle peasant people. A strong army is an army of good class. When we look at our army, what class it is? 95 percent poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, and other than that, some middle peasants. This is why this army is strong, whether the regular main force army, the Sector army, or the militia army. The people are the same. The people can defend the rear battlefield as long as they are poor peasants and lower-middle peasants. With their bare hands, they can attack. With knives and machetes, they can attack. In seizing state power, the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants play the leading role. Who is skilled at taking up a gun? The poor peasants and lower-middle peasants. By taking up a gun we mean being skilled at war, not being skilled at shooting circles, but skilled at war. We mean going to war for our Army. Speaking generally, there is no training, but they are skilled at waging war in a way. Skilled because of what? Skilled because of its absolute class stance, the revolution is very brave and audacious. Therefore, we have confidence, we are crystal clear, and there is no problem of being vague. In the immediate term, strong. In the future, strong. In the immediate term, increasing production is strong, defense is strong. On into the future, the strategy of increasing production will be strong and national defense will be strong. That is very clear.

The enemies threaten us. The Americans threatened in one way, but we attacked and humiliatingly defeated them. But the enemies that embed themselves within us, when they threaten us, the <<Y>> [្រ = the Y(uon)] make propaganda to deceive us that the <<Y>> are strong. There are a number of embedded enemies working as cadres that say that our army cannot fight and defeat the <<Y>>, that the <<Y>> are very skilled fighters, that they have fought for a long time. These groups are agents of the territory-swallowing <<Y>>. They make propaganda like that in order to mislead the opinion of the masses, to mislead our army. But, the concrete truth is that our army is the stronger than the <<Y>>. What proof is there?

First: We fought and defeated the Americans before the <<Y>>. Do we see that we won first? Is that true or not? On this matter if we do not study from concrete experience, we will keep on believing the evil propaganda of the enemy. They mislead us into being afraid of the <<Y>>.

Second: The <<Y>> in the Southwest Zone (along with the West as well) crushed our sovereignty and independence. In 1973 they attacked us. We attacked them back. We attacked the <<Y>> from Amleang to Highway 4, all the way to Kampong Trach. Then

they asked to negotiate. If they had not asked to negotiate, they certainly would have fallen all the way back beyond the border. These days the fighting at the border is like that. Why are they not strong? It comes from class: their class and their line. Now they have transformed. They are revisionist, and more than a few enemy elements have joined them. Their worker-peasant class nature has transformed, and when their party has transformed, their army has transformed. With elements like this, this petty bourgeoisization with the general petty bourgeoisie having already gone into the army, are they stronger than the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, or not? Will the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants dare to fight, or not, if they invade us? Who would be more daring to make the sacrifices? The poor peasants and lower-middle peasants would be the more daring to make the sacrifices.



To go on the offensive to grow rice and increase production to 3 and 6 tons per hectare along with the plan set by the Party, and to surpass the plan, our Revolutionary Army also strongly contributed to the offensive.

This photo: Our revolutionary Army northwest of Phnom Penh is busily on the offensive transplanting rainy season rice.

Therefore, this is why the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants are strong in increasing production and strong in defending the country. This matter must be closely grasped. Grasp this core matter, the key, fundamental factor closely. Do not forget it. Do not forget how the enemy makes propaganda. Do not forget how they mislead us. They

mislead, they deceive the eye, that the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants are very difficult and are unable to do anything. At times we become confused. If we become confused, that is a very big mistake.

Now, those who do not yet know how to use machinery, do not yet know how to write well and work in offices have come to take charge of telegrams, telephones, and the like. They are the only ones remaining. As for the others, the <<clever>> ones, the majority of them are gone. How it is that they have all gone? Because the majority of them were from the middle class or higher. The enemy very quickly attracted the middle and higher classes to follow them. The middle and higher classes sway back-and-forth, but whenever the enemy entices them, they quickly agree to follow, in keeping with their true class nature. So then, each office, each ministry, is almost out of them. The enemy painted a lot of that group black by now, those that remain. Defense is the fundamental class. The offices are the fundamental class. They said to let the fundamental class go to defense; but the offices or anything technical, those that remain are also the fundamental class. The movement teaches us this. Therefore, it is imperative to be crystal clear; it is imperative to absorb this. It is imperative to absorb and be crystal clear in order to go on a strong offensive to sort out the cooperative problem.

If we leave it to anyone other than the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, the direction will not be socialism. If no-good class elements come to power at every echelon of the revolution, in particular in the cooperatives, down what path will they lead? Will they lead down the path of the collective or the path of private property? These people will lead toward private property. They will not lead there immediately. They will take us there a little at a time: stances will lean a little at a time. According to the law of cause and effect, there will be quantitative change a little at a time, and after a while qualitative change. When they have sufficient forces, they will attack us, and then we will awaken. If they do not yet have the forces, they will gradually build them. When they have the forces, they will attack us. That is the direction. The middle classes themselves sway back-and-forth, they search out the middle. As for the enemy and the other classes, they come to pull them back and it is easy to pull them because they sway and are happy to be pulled. If it's like that, what will be the direction? The direction will go to the right; and if they go to the right, this means that they walk the path of private property. And when they are private, what is that? What is the true nature of private property? The true nature of private property is the heart and soul of the capitalist class, meaning they go that way. On this, let me take the opportunity to express another opinion. The enemy makes the provocation <<Private property is easier than the collective. >> They make that provocation all the time at every location, that this person and that person, if they worked privately it would probably be easier. Private property cattle are easier. Private property water buffaloes are easier. Working privately is easier. Let me make it clear that from now on if anyone says that, we must re-educate them that the true nature of private property is the capitalist, and the capitalist is the oppressor class. Therefore, comrade, you are not walking with the worker-peasant class, you are walking with the capitalist class or are leading the capitalist class. Comrade when you open up to, when you open up

to talk about private property, you open up with that private property content, you open the door for the capitalists to enter. (Re-educate them like this.) This is for those who do not yet understand.

But one more thing, for those that do already understand and who make this kind of propaganda, measures must be taken. They make propaganda to open the door for the enemy, for the capitalist class to enter, for the oppressor class to enter, enter inside the cooperatives, enter inside our regime and attack the collective regime. If the capitalist class returns, what would happen with revolutionary state power? What would happen to the state power in the collectives? If that that happens, what will become of many of the cooperatives, state power throughout the country? Do you see? Just opening the door a little bit vis-à-vis private property means opening the door for the capitalist class to penetrate the state power of the worker-peasants. The capitalist class inside the country will come; the international capitalist class will come; they will come along together. The regime would turn into the same old regime, a return to the contemptible Nol's regime, a return to the Sihanouk regime (1941-1970), a return to the colonial and semi-colonial regimes. As for the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, what would happen to them? **On this, it is imperative to reeducate the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants so they will have class anger, have class combat, and have a firm class stance.** If so, all of us worker-peasants holding state power throughout the country at every location, what will become of us? We will become coolies again, coolies of the capitalists, all kinds of coolies. They will oppress and demean us like they did before. We will be cyclo-drivers again. Will the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants agree after decades of sacrifices, decades of political struggle, armed struggle, will they let them return? Will they agree to that, or not agree? It is imperative to whip up class anger, to whip up class anger toward the class enemy and anyone making propaganda about this matter. Especially after we have convened this education session, it is imperative to take measures against anyone making this kind of propaganda.

At the Zone Party Representative Conference during May 76 at Longveaek, when I arrived, I immediately met with the Zone Committee, and Hâm (ហ៉ាំ) was among them as well. Talking informally about this and that, Hâm said, <<Private property cattle are fatter than collective property cattle.>>, <<Petty bourgeois cattle, the cattle of the rich peasants, are fatter than the cattle of poor peasants.>> In the conference, I went into combat immediately. I had to struggle. This was class struggle. It was a struggle in terms of political stance, ideological stance, and organizational stance. Had I not struggled, that force would have spread more during the conference and we would have become even more confused. To believe that private property cattle are fatter than collective property cattle is to attack the collective regime, to attack the Party's socialist revolution, whether wittingly or unwittingly. But Hâm attacked in an organized way. He attacked in the status of an enemy. At that time, we did not yet know that he was an enemy, but we knew that speaking like, the stance was counter-revolutionary, in opposition to the collective regime. So then, this is why we struggled immediately during the conference.

After a while, we discovered that Hâm was an enemy embedded inside our Party. Therefore, the nature that he displayed was an attack on the socialist regime. With just

that, we gradually came to see his nature. He attacked beginning with small things like that. In fact, he attacked the collective regime. So then, this why it is imperative to whip up the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants so understand the reasons. If sometime the door is re-opened to private property, what will become of the poor peasant and the lower-middle peasant class? Therefore, it is imperative to whip up:

1. To whip up inside our ranks
2. To whip up among the people

Since we had not yet profoundly whipped them up, we had not yet re-educated them to deeply understand the matter of class, class nature, true class content, the true nature of state power in order to seize state power, in order to defend state power, and what state power is, we had not yet reeducated them constantly, deeply, at clearly at all. Therefore, this is why the enemies and the various classes are still able to deceive them. If we whip them up like this, the enemy will not be able to enter. The enemies embedded inside will be unable to do anything. The enemies outside will not be able to enter. We will make the forces of the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants mightier and hold even mightier power. Increasing production will be strong. Taking up arms to defend the country will be strong.


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Now, what is the process of setting up the cooperatives? Propose that by late 1977, at least 50 percent or more of the cooperatives throughout the entire Zone be set up to be good and clean in accordance with the class line.


Therefore, what is to be done from now until the end of the year? It is imperative to arrange for the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants to take charge of state power in every part of each cooperative in more than 50 percent of the cooperatives throughout the Zone, and by mid 1978 at the latest, 100 percent.

X X X

Notice: **Propose that every leadership echelon in the Party concentrate on examining, discussing, and studying this presentation conscientiously in order to take it for implementation in their respective Zones and get good results.**



This photo: Our revolutionary workers in a land transport unit are on the offensive manufacturing nuts and bolts and all kinds of vehicle spare parts with the highest innovative spirit.



THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAG